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Abstract
Three Essays on Trade and Local Labor Markets
Sandeep Sharma
This dissertation studies the effect of trade on wage dispersion, crime rates and alcohol
consumption at the local labor market level in the the U.S. The first chapter develops a
new measure for skill to investigate the effects of offshoring on wages of three types of
workers: high-skilled, medium-skilled, and low-skilled. I also look at the effect of offshoring
on wages of offshorable occupations. Although the previous literature emphasizes the impact
of offshoring on the skill premium, I find that job characteristics such as offshorability is
critical in explaining the wage effect. Chapter 2 analyzes the effects of increasing import
exposure from the top 6 trading partners of the US (China, Canada, Mexico, Germany, Japan
and Korea) on property and violent crimes for the period 1992-2006 at the commuting zone
level. My results indicate that a $1000 increase in Chinese exposure increases the property
crimes by about 3 percent. On the other hand, the same amount of increase in import
exposure from three other developed country trading partners, Germany, Japan and Korea,
reduces property crimes between 2 to 4 percent. I find no evidence on the change of violent
crimes from any of the countries. The last chapter examines the effects of increasing import
competition from China on alcohol consumption at the county level for the years 2002-2006.
Recent literature has shown that increasing import competition from China worsens the
labor market outcomes. Lower cumulative earnings and the fear of job loss may increase
financial stress for workers who may resort to alcohol as a coping mechanism. I find that
increasing import exposure from China increases both the prevalence of drinking and binge
drinking among workers. The effect is more pronounced for men than women. Further,
for men, binge drinking has a larger effect than prevalence of drinking, whereas for women,
prevalence of drinking has a larger effect than binge drinking.
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1Chapter 1
Offshoring and U.S. Wages: Evidence
from Individual-Level Data
1.1 Introduction
In recent years, falling transportation costs and advancements in information technology
have allowed firms to fragment their production process and to increase their offshoring
activities. The inclusion of developing countries with low labor costs in the global market
allows firms to shift their highly labor intensive production from the North to the South.
This has led many market research companies to predict that offshoring would lead to a
massive job loss in developed nations (McCarthy et al., 2002; Parker et al., 2004). As a
result, offshoring has received a great deal of attention in policy discussions in the US.
A large number of studies have well-documented the change in wage structure and in-
crease in skill-premium for the U.S.1 The general consensus of the literature is that before
the 1980’s, the growth rates at different parts of the wage distribution were similar and the
wage differences were relatively stable. However, since the late 80’s, the wage gap between
various groups has been widening. Goldin and Katz (2007) show that a large part of the
increase in wage dispersion can be explained by the educational wage differential. Their
study shows that the period before the 1980’s saw an increase in both the demand for skilled
labor and supply of skilled labor that allowed for a stable wage differential. Since the early
1See Burkhauser et al. (2011) Van Reenen (2011) Levy and Murnane (1992) Katz and Murphy (1992)
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80’s, using various data sources, Katz and Autor (1999) find an increase in skill premium for
educated workers. The study estimates that real wages of those with less than 12 years of
education fell by 13.4%, while real wages fell by 20.2% for workers with 12 years of education
between 1979 and 1995. During the same period, wages of workers with a college degree or
more rose by 3.4%.
There has been a considerable debate on whether the increase in skill premium is a
result of technological change or growth in international trade and offshoring. Feenstra and
Hanson (1996, 1999) argue that although technological change is an important factor in
explaining the wage differential, focusing solely on technological change would obscure more
fundamental questions regarding how firms respond to import competition and how these
responses, in turn, affect the labor market.
Initial studies that looked at the effect of trade in final goods on skill-premium could
not find empirical evidence to support the theory of factor abundance.2 New theories were
developed to understand the mechanism through which trade would affect wages, which
increased theoretical literature on offshoring. Offshoring can lead to within-industry wage
differential because when an industry relocates the unskill-intensive stages of its production
process abroad, it expands the skill intensity of production at home. This increases the rela-
tive demand for skilled workers widening the wage differential between skilled and unskilled
workers.
The data for direct measure of offshoring activities by firms, however, are only limited
to a few subset of countries and are mostly confidential and not publicly available. Trade
literature has used different measures to proxy offshoring, such as total employment of foreign
affiliates among multinational U.S. firms, import penetration, and trade in intermediate
inputs. One of the most widely used measure of offshoring was developed by Feenstra and
Hanson (1996) that defines offshoring as the share of non-energy inputs that are imported.
I will use this measure as a proxy for offshoring.
Initially, the above proxy was used to measure material offshoring for manufacturing
2Stolper and Samuelson (1941) predicted that high skilled workers wage would rise in the North but fall in
the South. Many studies (Berman et al., 1994; Belkman et al., 1998) found empirical evidence contradicting
the theory
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industries, but was later modified to include service offshoring to reflect the fast growth
of offshoring in services. Although early studies mainly focused on industry-level wage
differential, a new wave of literature looks at the effect of offshoring activities of industries
at individual-level wages. Individual level data allows us to control observable demographic
characteristics that may affect wages.
In this paper, I investigate the effect of both material and service offshoring of manu-
facturing industries in the U.S. from 1999-2009 on individual wages obtained from the CPS
March Supplement. Only a handful of studies so far have looked at the effect at an indi-
vidual level. For instance, Egger et al. (2007), Ebenstein et al. (2014) look at individual
data but only consider the effect of material offshoring. Liu and Trefler (2008) study service
offshoring, but only those offshored to India and China. Geishecker and Go¨rg (2013) look
at the effect of both material and service offshoring on individual wages for the U.K. Tem-
pesti (2015) looks at the effect on individual wages for the U.S; however, he only looks at
material offshoring. Moreover, like Geishecker and Go¨rg (2013), the study uses educational
attainment as a proxy for skill.
I contribute to this growing literature by defining a novel measure for skill as a composite
set of skill indicators using the O*NET database to look at the effects of material and service
offshoring on skill premium. This measure captures the skill-set workers have acquired on
the job without any formal education.3 In addition, I also look at the effects of offshoring on
wages for occupation that are offshorable.4 My analysis finds that both material and service
offshoring increases the skill premium for high-skill and medium-skill workers. I find that a
10 percentage point increase in material offshoring increases the skill premium by about 3
percent. I also find that material and service offshoring has a negative impact on wages of
offshorable occupations. Offshorable occupations are primarily defined as those that require
low face-to-face interaction, minimal decision-making, and are easily automated.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 defines the measure for
3Most studies use level of education as a measure of skill. However, such a measure would not account for
skills learned on the job. Thus, my measure of skill attempts to account for skills that are learned without
formal education.
4I use Firpo et al. (2011) measure of classifying the occupation into offshorable jobs. Their study only
looks at the return to occupational tasks, and do not specifically look at the direct effect of offshoring on
the wages of these offshorable jobs.
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offshoring and discusses the trend in service and material offshoring. Section 3 reviews the
literature on the effect of offshoring on wages. Section 4 discusses the data and empirical
methodology, and Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 includes robustness checks and
Section 7 concludes.
1.2 Offshoring
When a firm relocates parts of its production process outside the firm, it is called out-
sourcing. The fragmentation may include both material and immaterial (service) stages of
production. Further, outsourcing can be either domestic or foreign. When a firm in the
U.S. contracts parts of its production process to a different firm within the U.S., it is called
domestic outsourcing. If a firm in the U.S. contracts parts of its production process to a
location outside the U.S., it is called foreign outsourcing. This paper will focus on foreign
outsourcing, also called offshoring.
Offshoring includes both the procurement of inputs from foreign firms owned by the
U.S. firm and the arm’s length production by a foreign firm not affiliated with the U.S. firm.
Material outsourcing takes the form of imported physical goods that are used as intermediate
inputs in the production and assembly process. Likewise, service offshoring takes the form of
customer call centers, business services, accountancy and tax services, and financial services.
1.2.1 Measuring Offshoring
It is difficult to get a direct measure of offshoring because consistent data on offshoring
activities by U.S. firms are not easily available. As a result, the trade literature has used dif-
ferent measures for offshoring, such as total employment of foreign affiliates of multinational
U.S. firms, import penetration and trade in intermediate inputs. One of the most widely
used measure of offshoring was developed by Feenstra and Hanson (1996) (FH hereafter)
that defines offshoring as the share of non-energy inputs that are imported.
I measure offshoring using the methodology introduced by FH for material offshoring
and the method developed by Amiti and Wei (2009) to calculate service offshoring. The ser-
vices included are 1) finance, 2) insurance, 3) telecommunication, computer and information
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services, and 4) business services.5
For a given industry i at time t, material offshoring OSMit is defined as the share of the
industry’s total non-energy inputs that are imported. Mathematically, it is calculated as:
OSMit =
∑
j
[
Mjit
Nit
]
×
[
Ijt
Yjt
]
(1.1)
where, Mjit is the purchases of input j by industry i at time t, Nit is the total non-energy
inputs used by industry i at time t, Ijt is the imports of inputs j at time t, and Yjt is the
total domestic supply of input j at time t.6
The first term represents the share of input j as a proportion of the total non-energy
inputs. The second term represents the share of good or service j that was imported na-
tionally.Similarly, I can calculate the measure for service offshoring, OSSit, if goods j that
represent service inputs. Further, as the data on trade of each input is not available at an in-
dustry level, I cannot tell the amount of those imports used by a certain industry. Therefore,
as in the literature, I rely on the “proportionality assumption” such that every industry that
uses input j, uses the input in the same proportion. Data on input purchases is calculated
using the annual input-output table constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
based on the 2002 benchmark table of Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Data on trade
of materials comes from Schott (2008), and data on trade of services are obtained from the
BEA International Economic Accounts.
However, there are a few potential problems with the offshoring measure used in this
paper(Amiti and Wei, 2005; Houseman et al., 2011; Feenstra and Jensen, 2012). First,
the measure has the “proportionality assumption” due to the lack of data on imports by
individual industry. Studies for Germany (Milberg and Winkler, 2010) and Asia (Puzzello,
2012) show that this assumption does not hold well. Second, I can not ascertain whether
the imported goods are intermediate inputs or final use commodities. Third, imports from
affiliated foreign firms are cheaper than importing from independent firms; but I cannot
differentiate the two types of imports and will use the same producers value for both. Despite
5I exclude other service imports such as travel and education because of minimal trade in these sectors.
6Total domestic supply is calculated as the total production plus net imports.
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its problems, the measure has been frequently used in the literature as a reasonable proxy
of offshoring.
1.2.2 Trends in Offshoring
Recent economic literature has well-documented the tremendous rise in offshoring by
U.S. firms starting from the 1970’s. FH measure offshoring as defined in equation 1.1 and
find that imported material inputs has risen from 6.5% in 1972 to 11.6% in 1990. Shocks in
exogenous factors in the 90s has led to a faster pace of globalization which has facilitated
offshoring activities by firms. Bottini et al. (2007) point out three such factors: 1) reduction
in trade barriers, 2) reduction in transportation cost, and 3) technological change.
First, regional free-trade agreements such as NAFTA eliminated red tape allowing firms to
relocate their production process. Yi (2003) shows the non-linear response of trade volumes
to tariff reduction; thus, even a small decrease in tariff rates leads to a large increase in
trade volume. Baier and Bergstrand (2001) studied the relationship between transportation
costs and trade volume for industrialized nations. They estimate that the reduction in
transportation costs explains about 8% increase in the trade volume post World War II
until the late 80s. However, the impact of falling transportation cost, plays a minor role in
facilitating trade relative to the reduction in trade barriers (Hummels, 1999). Lastly, in the
past few decades, the advances in computer, network technology, and access to internet has
expanded service offshoring in the form of call centers, tax and accountancy services, and
financial services.
In addition, as economies have converged in economic size, multinational firms have
become more vertically specialized, which has increased trade in intermediate goods (Feen-
stra et al., 1998). More importantly, rapid globalization has introduced large developing
economies such as China and India with different factor endowments in the global market,
thus providing further opportunities for offshoring.
Initially, most offshoring activities involved material offshoring. This phenomenon was
mainly led by labor intensive industries that had an incentive to fragment their relatively
unskilled-intensive production process internationally to exploit the lower wages of unskilled
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labor in developing economies. Recently, however, the advancements in technology has
increased service offshoring. However, it comprises only a tiny fraction compared to material
offshoring. Figure 1.1 shows the average trend in both material and service offshoring from
1999-2009. Material offshoring has risen from about 14.5% in 1999 to 19.07% in 2008.
Likewise, although service offshoring is a small part of manufacturing industries, it has risen
at an average annual rate of 6.8%.
Figure 1.2 presents a clearer picture of the trend at the 3-digit NAICS industry level.7
The electronic manufacturing sector’s material offshoring has risen by more than 44% dur-
ing the sample period. Within the sector, the sharp rise can be attributed to audio and
video equipment manufacturing. There offshoring has risen from 32.3% in 1999 to 39.7%
in 2004 and to 48.4% in 2009. We see similar increases in the appliance manufacturing in-
dustry and primary metal manufacturing, where material offshoring has risen by more than
36% and 31% , respectively. An industry that hasn’t been affected as much is the food
manufacturing industry, where material offshoring still stands below 5%. However, within
the food manufacturing industry, offshoring by the grain and oilseed industry has increased
by about 3 percentage point from 4.5% in 1999 to 7.1% in 2009. Likewise, the figure also
shows the increase in service offshoring. Although service offshoring remains below 1% of
the total production process, there’s been a sharp increase in service offshoring activities.
For instance, in wood product manufacturing, service offshoring has risen by over 200% from
1999-2009. Similarly, such sharp increases can be seen in the non-metallic mineral industry,
transportation industry and chemical industry. Within the chemical industry, one of the
fastest growing service offshoring industries is pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing,
which has seen its offshoring increased from about 0.4% to 0.9% during the period.
7In my analysis, I use industry at the 4-digit NAICS level to merge with the CPS industry classification.
The graph shows it at the 3-digit industry level to see a trend at an aggregated industry level.
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1.3 Literature Review
1.3.1 Conceptual Framework
Traditionally, the effect of trade on wages has been empirically tested from the Stolper
and Samuelson (1941) theory that predicts trade will lead in an increase in wages for factors
used intensively in the production of that good. The North is relatively abundant in skilled
labor, whereas the South is relatively abundant in unskilled labor. Thus, the theory implies
that the skill-premium for North would increase while the skill-premium for the South would
decrease. However, empirical studies found that skill premium in both the North and South
was increasing (Belkman et al., 1998). Furthermore, studies also found that there was
an increase in the skill-intensity within industry and not an expansion of skill-intensive
industries. This led to finding new mechanisms through which trade affects the wage and
skill premium. Therefore, rather than focusing on the trade in final goods, recent theories
have looked at trade affecting wages through trade in intermediate good. Thus, there is an
increasing focus on the effect of offshoring on skill premium.
In seminal papers, Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999) emphasized the role of trade in
intermediate goods within an industry. Their model had a single final goods sector that
used a continuum of tradable inputs to produce the good. The production of these inputs
differed in their skill-intensity. In the model, when capital share in production cost is the
same across inputs and the trade costs are zero, then in equilibrium, countries that are skill-
abundant specialized in the production of skill-intensive inputs, whereas countries that are
unskill-abundant specialized in unskilled-intensive inputs. Hence, as trade costs have fallen,
the production of less-skill intensive inputs has shifted from the North to South. Further,
the production processes shifted to the South are more skill-intensive than the previous
productions in the South. As a result, the fragmentation of the production process increases
the relative demand for skilled labor in both North and South and thus increases the skill
premium of the workers.
However, more recently, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) propose a production
process that mainly focuses on tasks that are tradable rather than focusing on the goods.
Therefore, as it becomes easier to move tasks offshore, it will have a productivity effect, such
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that all factors can share the gains from the trade in tasks.
1.3.2 Empirical Literature
The initial literature that looked at the effect of material offshoring on skill premium
focused on industry-level aggregates, where the relative demand for skilled workers was
measured by the skilled labor share of the wage bill. Feenstra and Hanson (1999) (FH
hereafter) used the offshoring proxy as defined in equation 1.1 and found that for the period
during 1979-1990, offshoring explained 15-40% of the increase in the skilled workers’ share in
wage bill for the U.S. Yan (2006) employed the same measures as FH and studied the case for
Canada by analyzing 84 manufacturing industries from 1981-1996 and found that offshoring
increased the non-production share of the wage bill by 0.12 percent annually. Likewise, Hsieh
and Woo (2005) studied how offshoring to China affected the relative demand for skilled
workers in Hong-Kong from 1971-1996. China opened up its market for foreign investors
in 1980, which allowed Hong Kong to easily offshore its production process due to its close
proximity. They concluded that offshoring to China accounted for about 40% - 50% increase
in the relative demand for skilled labor in Hong Kong.
More recently, the offshoring literature has started to focus not just on material off-
shoring, but also on service offshoring. Although service offshoring accounts for a very small
percentage of the total offshoring activities, it is increasing at a fast rate as shown in section
1.2.2. As with material offshoring, direct data on service offshoring is hard to find. There-
fore, Amiti and Wei (2005) employ a similar method as FH to proxy for offshoring in service
inputs. They study the effects of service offshoring on labor productivity in the U.S. man-
ufacturing industry from 1992-2000 by looking at the value-added per worker. Due to data
constraints, they limit their measure for service offshoring to telecommunication, information
technology, financial and insurance services. Apart from using industry fixed effects in their
analysis, they also use the lagged value of offshoring to address the problem of endogeneity
of offshoring decisions. However, unlike the previous studies, they find that the effects of
material offshoring are insignificant, but service offshoring increases labor productivity by
about 10%.
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There are a few drawbacks in using industry-level aggregates to measure the impact
of offshoring. First, there may be compositional changes in the workforce of industries in
response to offshoring shocks so that it will change the average wages. Second, it doesn’t
account for worker heterogeneity within each industry. Therefore, using individual level data
can control for observable individual characteristics that affect wages. Lovely and Richardson
(2000) study the effect on individual wages by looking at the data from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) for the 1981-1992 period. They define skilled workers based on
the years of education. Further, they focus only on the effects of imports and exports
and not on the measure of offshoring discussed above. They find that trade with newly
industrialized countries increases the premium for skilled workers. Kosteas (2008) uses the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) for the period of 1979-1996 to look at the
impact of imports from low-wage countries. He separates the workers into white-collars
and blue-collars arbitrarily based on their occupation, and finds that rising imports from
low-wage countries drives down the wages for all workers, but the effects are stronger for
blue-collar wages. The study finds that a one-percentage-point increase in the low-wage
import share results in a 2.8% decline in blue-collar wages. However, he doesn’t interact
offshoring with the white-collar dummy to get a clear picture of the effect of offshoring on
wages. Furthermore, a problem with using data from the PSID and NLSY is the limited
sample size. For instance, Kosteas (2008) sample is limited to workers who were between
ages of 14-21 in 1979, thus failing to account for the effect of workers who were older than
that during the period.
As a result, the recent literature has focused on individual data from the Current Pop-
ulation Survey (CPS) because of the availability of a larger sample. Liu and Trefler (2008)
use this data to look at the effect of service offshoring to China and India from 1995-2006
on industry and occupation switching. They only look at the transactions that take place
between unaffiliated parties. To look at occupation switching, they match workers in con-
secutive years. They find that offshoring to China and India has small effects on occupation
and industry switching. Other studies ask a more subtle question of whether offshoring
affects wages through occupation switching or industry switching. Ebenstein et al. (2014)
create a measure of occupation exposure and industry exposure to look at the effect of off-
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shoring.Their analysis finds that occupational exposure to globalization has significant wage
effects, whereas industry exposure has no significant impact.
A more closely related paper is Tempesti (2015) who uses CPS March supplement data
to look at the effect of offshoring on the skill premium from 1979-1990. The study looks at
industry at a more aggregated level (SIC 2 digits) and only looks at the effect of material
offshoring and doesn’t consider the effect of service offshoring. In my analysis, I study the
effect of service offshoring and material offshoring. Further, in his paper, skill is based on
the education level of workers, whereas I develop a new proxy to include the skills that may
have been learned on the job and not necessarily acquired through education.
1.4 Empirical Methodology
1.4.1 Data
My sample links individual level workers’ data with industrial measures of offshoring and
occupational measure of offshorability. Individual level data is collected from the Current
Population Survey (CPS) March Supplement for the years 1999-2009. CPS randomly samples
addresses in the US, where residents in the address are surveyed for four consecutive months,
dropped for the next eight months and then surveyed again for four more months. The March
supplement has additional questions about labor market activities allowing classification of
individuals by industry and occupation. I restrict the sample to the civilian population aged
16-65, who worked at least one week during the past year. Hourly wage is calculated from
earnings using the weeks worked last year and the usual hours worked per week. The wages
are then converted to 2009 real dollars. I further restrict my sample to workers who earned
at least 10 cents an hour and dropped workers who earned more than 1000 dollars per hour.
As I am only able to construct material and service offshoring for manufacturing industries,
I only look at workers in manufacturing industries.
Data to calculate the measure for material offshoring comes from the annual input-output
table constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) based on the 2002 benchmark
table of Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Data for imports and exports of material goods
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are obtained from Schott (2008) and data for trade in services comes from BEA International
Economic Accounts. The industry level data on total factor productivity comes from NBER’s
calculations provided by Wayne Gary.
The proxy for skills and occupation offshorability comes from the Occupation Informa-
tion Network (O*NET), a successor to the Department of Occupation Titles (DOT). O*NET
collects data on standardized occupation-specific descriptors by surveying a broad range of
workers from each occupation. The O*NET content model identifies six major domains that
specify key attributes and characteristics of workers and occupations. These are: worker
characteristics, worker requirements, experience requirements, occupational requirements,
workforce characteristics and occupation-specific information. The skill index uses informa-
tion from worker requirements and the information for occupation offshorability comes from
worker characteristics and occupational requirements.
My final sample consists of 81,107 cross-section samples of manufacturing workers from
1999-2009. Table 1.1 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables. The sample mainly
consists of married, white, citizens and full-time workers. About 16% of the workers in the
sample are high-skilled, 40% are medium skilled and the rest are low-skilled. The average of
lag material offshoring is 17.5% and 0.28% for service offshoring.
1.4.2 Skill Index
In the literature, a worker is usually classified into different skill-level based on either
education level (college graduates vs non-college graduates) or years of experience. However,
classifying skills based on only a single criterion like education does not account for skill-
sets that workers learn and master on the job without any formal education. Therefore, by
defining skills as a composite set of skill indicators such as critical thinking and complex
problem solving skills, we can better classify individuals into different skill-levels.
O*NET collects data on skill requirements, among others, for more than 800 occupations.
These skills are further characterized as Basic Skills and Cross-Functional Skills. Basic skills
are defined as “developed capacities that facilitates learning or the more rapid acquisition
of knowledge” and cross-functional skills are defined as “developed capacities that facilitates
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performance of activities that occur across jobs.” To define my skill index, I combine two
aspects of basic skills: reading comprehension and critical thinking, and two aspects of cross-
functional skills: complex problem solving and judgment and decision-making. For each of
these skills, the dataset provides a measure of “importance” based on how important the
skill is to the job responsibilities and a value of “level” that shows the proficiency in the
skill. The importance measure ranges from 0 to 5 (0 being least important and 5 being very
important) and the level value ranges from 0 to 7 (0 being less proficient and 7 being highly
proficient). To calculate the skill index, I arbitrarily assign Cobb-Douglas weights of two
thirds to “importance” and one third to “level”8
Mathematically, the skill index can be written as
SIo =
∑
k∈Sp
I
2/3
ok ∗ L1/3ok (1.2)
where Sp is the skills elements.
Table 1.2 shows the occupations that receive high and low scores in the normalized
measure.9 The results agree with the general consensus of high-skill and low-skill occupations
as presented in other studies. For instance, lawyers and chief executives have the highest
scores in the index, whereas graders and sorters of agricultural products and cleaner of
vehicles and equipments score low on the index. I then use this index to classify individuals
into three different categories of skill: high, medium and low. I classify individuals as high
skill if their skill index is above the 75th percentile, as medium skill if the index ranges from
the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile, and as low skill if the index is below the 25th
percentile.
1.4.3 Occupation Offshorability
I follow Firpo et al. (2011) to look at the potential offshorability of occupation by con-
structing an index based on three categories: automation, face-to-face, and decision-making.
8Blinder et al. (2009) assigns a similar Cobb-Douglas measure to create offshorability index for occupation
using O*NET database
9Since the absolute value of the index has no particular meaning, I normalize the index by dividing them
by the maximum value of the skill observed over all occupation. The normalized measure is useful in ranking
the skill-level, whereas the absolute value have no particular meaning
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The data comes from the work activities and work context criteria of occupational require-
ments domain of the O*NET database.
The “automation” category is constructed to reflect the degree of potential automation
of the job. It includes five elements from the work context criteria. They are: “degree of
automation”, “importance of repeating same tasks”, “structures versus unstructured work”,
“pace determined by speed of equipment”, and “spend time making repetitive motions”. In
contrast, the “face-to-face” category reflects the need for the workers to interact with other
colleagues so that these occupations are not easily offshorable to a different location. The cat-
egory includes four work-activity elements and one work-context element. The work-activity
elements are: “coaching and developing others”, “establishing and maintaining interpersonal
relationships”, “assisting and caring for others”, and “performing for or working directly with
the public”. It also adds the “face-to-face discussion” element from work-context. Likewise,
the “decision-making” category reflects the responsibilities and creativity of the occupation.
It is constructed using “making decision and solving problems”, “thinking creatively”, and
“developing objectives and strategies” elements from the work-activities and “responsibility
for outcomes and results” and “frequency of decision making” elements from work-context.
All work-activity elements contain information on the “level” and “importance” of the
element. The work-context elements contain information on level and the frequency of
five categorical levels.10 The work-activity elements are arbitrarily assigned a Cobb-Douglas
weight of two-thirds to “importance” and one-third to “level” for a weighed sum, and multiply
the frequency (F) with the value of the level (V) for the work-context elements.
Matematically, the total composite score, CSm, for occupation j in category m is com-
puted as
OFFo =
∑
m∈Ap
I
2/3
ok L
1/3
ok +
∑
l∈Cp
Fol ∗ Vol (1.3)
where Ap is the work activity elements, and Cp is the work context elements in the
category OFFo.
11
10For instance, for “face-to-face discussion”, the frequency is classified into five categories: a) never, b)once
a year or more but not every month, c)once a month or more but not every week, d)once a week or more
but not every day, e) everyday.
11Since the absolute value of the index has no particular meaning, I normalize the index by dividing them
by the maximum value of the skill observed over all occupation. The normalized measure is useful in ranking
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Using the above measures, I define “not face-to-face” and “not decision-making” cat-
egories as the reverse of “face-to-face” and “decision-making”. I then combine the three
categories: automation, not face-to-face and not decision-making into a single measure to
look at the likelihood of offshorability. I hypothesize that occupations that are more likely
to be offshorable will suffer a higher wage loss compared to other occupations as a result of
material and service offshoring.
Table 1.3 shows the different occupations that score high on the the different categories
calculated above. I use the normalized score to rank each worker in one of the categories
based on its index score. For instance, if the score is above the mean in not-face-to-face cat-
egory, the worker will be classified as not requiring to have many face-to-face interactions.
Likewise, after I combine the three categories into a single offshorability category, if a worker
scores above the mean, he is placed under the likelihood of his job being offshored. If the
score is below the mean, the chances of the job being offshored falls. Under automation, com-
puter control programmers and operators rank high, whereas teachers and clergy rank low.
Likewise, for not face-to-face, telephone operators and pressers in the textile and garment
industry rank high, whereas managers rank low. A similar result is seen in the not-decision-
making as graders and sorters rank high and production managers rank low. Combining all
three into a single measure, it shows that textile knitting and weaving occupations have a
higher chance of being offshored compared to medical technicians and dentists.
1.4.4 Econometric Specification
I use the Mincer human capital wage equation to measure the effect of offshoring on
individual wages. I regress the log wages of workers i in industry j in period t on the lagged
measure of service and material offshoring at the industry level and individual skill-level
while controlling for individual observable characteristics such as age, sex, marital status
and race. I use the lagged measure of offshoring for two reasons. First, simultaneous shocks
may affect both wage and offshoring in a given year. Second, the effect of offshoring decision
will not affect wages in the same year as it takes time for the firms to implement them.
the skill-level, whereas the absolute value have no particular meaning
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In addition, as Ebenstein et al. (2014) point out, there are further challenges in estimating
the casual effect of offshoring on wages. Industries that are more likely to be involved in
offshoring activities are also more likely to pay lower wages. I, therefore, include industry
fixed-effects Ij to control for these. Also, there may be common time-varying shocks such as
business-cycles that may affect both offshoring and wages. To address this concern, I include
the time fixed-effects δt. In addition, I control for the lagged of total factor productivity at
the industry level, TFPjt−1, to account for any changes in productivity that would affect the
relative demand for labor.
The basic regression model takes the following form:
ln(woizt) = α + β1OSMi,t−1 + β2OSSi,t−1 + β3SIo + γXzt + δt + Ii + zt (1.4)
where ln(w)zoit is the log of hourly wage of worker z in industry i and occupation o at
time t. OSMit−1 and OSSit−1 is the measure for material and serving offshoring in industry
i and time t, respectively. SIo denotes the skill of the workers, Xot is a vector of standard
demographic variables like age, sex, and dummies for marriage, race and full-time/part-time
status.
In addition, I also examine the effect of offshoring on the wages of different occupation
based on their offshorability. To look at the effect, my specification becomes,
ln(woizt) = α + β1OSMi,t−1 + β2OSSi,t−1 + β3OFFo + γXzt + δt + Ii + zt (1.5)
where OFFo represents the occupational offshorability of worker z at time t. I will
also interact the offshorability of occupation with offshoring measures to see the effect of
offshoring on the wage of workers whose jobs are offshorable.
1.5 Results
I first look at the effect of material offshoring and service offshoring on individual wages.
The result is reported in table 1.4.12 In column 1, I regress wages on only the demographic
12I provide the complete table with all the demographic variables in the appendix.
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control variables and find that all the controls have the expected correlation. In columns 2
and 3, I regress log of hourly wage on material offshoring, service offshoring, and both mea-
sures of offshoring, respectively, while controlling for individual demographic characteristics
and industry-specific measures. Consistent with the labor literature, compared to low-skill
workers, I find that high-skill workers earned 40 percent more and medium-skill workers
earned 18 percent more. Likewise, workers with college degree and some college classes
earn more than high-school graduates. In the first column, when I only include material
offshoring, I find a negative insignificant effect. Service offshoring has a positive effect on
wages as seen on column 2. However, when I include both the measures in column 3, they
are qualitatively the same, but are statistically insignificant.
A more interesting question to explore would be the effect of service and material out-
sourcing on individuals with different skill-level. If an industry is more likely to offshore
mainly activities performed by a certain skill group to a foreign firm, then we can expect it
to have a negative effect on wages of that skill group. In table 1.5, I look at the effect of both
material and service offshoring on workers of different skill levels. The first column shows
that a 10 percentage-point increase in material offshoring will increase the high-skill wage by
2.2 percentage and the medium skill wages by 2.4 percentage. In the second column, includ-
ing interaction terms with service offshoring, I find that both high-skill and medium skill
workers earn statistically significantly higher wages than low-skilled workers. Further, when
I include all the interaction terms together, I find that material offshoring negatively affects
low-skilled workers, whereas a 10 percentage point increase in material offshoring increases
the wages of high-skilled workers by 2.9 percent and medium skilled workers by 3 percent.
This result is consistent with the idea that if the low-skilled intensive part of the production
process is offshored, it will reduce the relative demand for unskilled workers, thus negatively
impacting their wages.
In addition, apart from the skill-level of the workers, recent theories show that offshoring
may have significant effects on workers who perform tasks that are easily offshorable. There-
fore, first, I will look at the wages of workers on different task spectrum and then look at
the effect of offshoring on wages of these workers. In table 1.6, I look at the wages for
workers under automation, not decision-making, and not face-to-face. I anticipate that since
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the tasks performed by workers in these classifications are easily offshored, offshoring should
have a negative effect on their wages. In the first three columns, when I control for these
tasks separately, I find that workers in all three tasks earn less than their counterparts. Fur-
ther, when I regress all three together, I find that all three occupational tasks have negative
effect on wages, but occupations with low requirements for face-to-face interactions suffer
the most. Workers in automation category earn 7.7 percent less than workers with low risk
of automation. Similarly, workers who do not require much decision-making earn 6.7 percent
less and workers with few face-to-face interaction tasks earn 11 percent less.
I then combine the three measures of occupational tasks into a single measure of off-
shorability to look at the effect of material and service offshoring on these occupations. In
table 1.7, column 1 shows the results for offshorability and the subsequent column adds
the interaction term with material offshoring, service offshoring, and both the offshoring
together. I find that people whose occupation have a higher chance of being offshored earn
17 percent less. However, when I interact with material offshoring, I find a negative effect
but it is insignificant. However, it does show a statistically significant negative effect as a
result of service offshoring. In the last column, I find that a 10 percentage point increase in
material offshoring will result in lowering the wages of offshorable occupations by 0.8 per-
cent. Similarly, a 10 percentage point increase in service offshoring will decrease their wages
by 1.5 percent. This result is consistent with the idea that if the occupation requires low
face-to-face interactions, can easily be automated and does not involve significant decision
making, then these tasks can be more easily monitored offshore than more complex tasks,
thus negatively impacting the wages for these workers.
1.6 Robustness Checks
In this section, I’ll look at a different classification of skill for workers. In my main
analysis, I classified workers who were above the 75th percentile as high-skill, between 25
to 75 percentile as medium skill and workers below the 25th percentile as low-skill. For
a robustness check, I assign workers above 66 percentile to high-skill, between 33 and 66
percentile to medium skill and below 33 percentile to low skill. I run a regression using
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the same specification as my main analysis and present the result in table 1.8. Although
the results differ slightly in their quantitative magnitude, they’re qualitatively the same and
statistically significant. I find that high-skill workers and medium-skilled workers earn 27 to
28 percent more than low-skill workers as a result of material offshoring. Likewise, the result
for service offshoring are also similar to my main analysis and statistically significant.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper looks at the effect of material and service offshoring on individual workers
wages based on two criteria: workers skill-level and the offshorability of their occupation.
I examine the effect by combining the individual level data from the March Supplement of
the CPS and the industry-level measures of service and material outsourcing for the period
1999-2009. For my analysis, I developed a new measure for skill using the O*NET database.
Previous literature has focused only on education as a measure for skill; however, by using
a singular measure for skill may overlook the new skills that workers have learned on the
job without any formal education. Therefore, I utilize the information on the important and
level of skills they perform on the job to create a skill-index to classify workers into three
types of skill-level. Further, in my analysis, I also used the Firpo et al. (2011) classification of
occupation offshorability to study the effect of material and service offshoring on the wages
of workers in occupations that had a higher chance of being offshored.
My results showed that workers with high and medium skill earn about 3 percent more
than workers with low skill as a result of a 10 percentage point increase in material offshoring.
A greater impact is found for service offshoring, where high skill workers earn 3.2 percent
more and medium-skilled workers earn 2.2 percent more for each percentage point increase in
service offshoring. However, it is important to note that the current level of service offshoring
stands well below 1 percent of the total production process. This result is consistent with
the previous literature and theory that shows that offshoring of the less skill-intensive part
of the production process will negatively impact the wages of workers involved in low-skill
intensive production process. This result was robust to a different classification of skill-level
based on the skill index I created.
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I also looked at the effect of on wages of occupations that have a higher probability of
being offshored. I found that occupations that required less decision-making, low face-to-face
interaction and a higher possibility of being automated earn less than their counterparts.
Combining all these three measures into a single measure of offshoring, I found that workers in
occupation with higher chances of being offshored earned 0.8 percent less with a 10 percentage
point increase in material offshoring. The result represented that it would be easier for firms
to monitor the performance of these occupations in an offshore location relatively easily
compared to occupations with complex tasks thus having a downward pressure on their
wages.
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Figure 1.1: Trends in Overall Material and Service Offshoring
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Figure 1.2: Trends in Sectoral Material and Service Offshoring
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
LnWage 2.896 0.666
Lag Mat. Offshoring 17.542 9.106
Lag Ser. Offshoring 0.285 0.16
Age1624 0.075 0.263
Age2539 0.356 0.479
High Skill 0.165 0.372
Med Skill 0.409 0.492
College 0.237 0.425
SomeCollege 0.262 0.439
lagTFP 1.014 0.254
Married 0.815 0.388
Male 0.699 0.459
Union 0.028 0.164
Full-Time 0.959 0.199
Citizen 0.827 0.378
White 0.838 0.369
N 81107
Table 1.2: Occupation Skill Rank
Occupation Title Skill Index
A: Occupation with High Skill Index
Lawyers 1.000
Biomedical Engineers 0.995
Actuaries 0.994
Chief Executives 0.992
Physicans and Surgeons 0.976
Medical Scientist 0.963
Research Analyst 0.963
B: Occupation with Low Skill Index
Janitors and Building Cleaners 0.524
Pressers, Textile, Garments and Related Materials 0.522
Food Preparation Workers 0.516
Dishwashers 0.512
Cafeteria Attendants 0.499
Cleaner of Vehicles and Equipments 0.418
Graders and Sorters, Agricultural Products 0.453
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Table 1.3: Occupation Task Rank
Occupation Title Occupation with High Score Occupation with Low Score
Automation Tire Builders, Hoist and Winch
Operators, Etchers and Engravers,
Computer Control Programmers and
Operators
Models and Demonstrators, Teach-
ers, Actors, Clergy
not Face To Face Tire Builders, Pressers (Textile and
Garments), Reinforcing Iron and Re-
bar Workers, Telephone Operators
Social and Community Service Man-
agers, Public Relation Managers,
Dentists, Physical Therapists
not Decision Mak-
ing
Graders and Sorters (Agricultural
Products), Lobby Attendants, Ex-
traction Workers, Pressers(Textile
and Garment)
Dentists, Pharmacists, Veterinari-
ans, Production Managers
Offshorability Tire Builders, Pressers (Textiles and
Garments), Textile Knitting and
Weaving, Paper Goods Machine Set-
ters
Veterinarians, Clergy, Emergency
Medican Technician, Dentists
Table 1.4: OLS Estimates of Offshoring on Skill-Premium
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES LnWage LnWage LnWage LnWage
Lag Mat. Offshoring -0.166 -0.0729
(0.105) (0.122)
Lag Ser. Offshoring 0.0938** 0.0800
(0.0420) (0.0487)
HighSkillOccOne 0.400*** 0.400*** 0.400***
(0.00639) (0.00639) (0.00639)
Med Skill Occupation 0.183*** 0.183*** 0.183***
(0.00408) (0.00408) (0.00408)
lagTFP 0.0345*** 0.0235* 0.0215* 0.0232*
(0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0123) (0.0126)
Constant 1.957*** 2.001*** 1.993*** 1.994***
(0.0313) (0.0306) (0.0308) (0.0309)
Observations 81,107 81,107 81,107 81,107
R-squared 0.368 0.403 0.403 0.403
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parantheses below the
coefficient estimates. Demographic controls include sex, age, race, edu-
cation, whether in a union, whether a citizen, education, and industry
and time fixed effects. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, ***1%
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Table 1.5: OLS Estimates of Skill and Offshoring Interaction
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES LnWage LnWage LnWage
Lag Mat. Offshoring -0.183 -0.0330 -0.224*
(0.126) (0.122) (0.126)
Lag Ser. Offshoring 0.0810* -0.0808 -0.0936*
(0.0487) (0.0516) (0.0516)
High Skill Occupation 0.395*** 0.347*** 0.291***
(0.0150) (0.0122) (0.0186)
Med Skill Occupation 0.180*** 0.169*** 0.112***
(0.00925) (0.00799) (0.0120)
Lag Mat. Off * High Skill 0.221*** 0.290***
(0.0687) (0.0686)
Lag Mat. Off * Med. Skill 0.248*** 0.301***
(0.0476) (0.0477)
lagSerOut * High Skill 0.304*** 0.324***
(0.0354) (0.0355)
lagSerOut * Med. Skill 0.200*** 0.220***
(0.0254) (0.0255)
lagTFP 0.0307** 0.0309** 0.0272**
(0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0127)
Constant 1.996*** 2.011*** 2.046***
(0.0312) (0.0312) (0.0315)
Observations 81,107 81,107 81,107
R-squared 0.404 0.405 0.405
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parantheses be-
low the coefficient estimates. Demographic controls include sex,
age, race, education, whether in a union, whether a citizen, ed-
ucation, and industry and time fixed effects. Significant at *
10%, ** 5%, ***1%
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Table 1.6: OLS Estimates on Occupational Measure of Offshorability
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES LnWage LnWage LnWage LnWage
Lag Mat. Offshoring 0.0556 -0.0406 0.00396 -0.00263
(0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.124)
Lag Ser. Offshoring 0.129*** 0.104** 0.131*** 0.123**
(0.0500) (0.0499) (0.0498) (0.0496)
AutomationOne -0.0979*** -0.0778***
(0.00444) (0.00450)
notDecisionMakingOne -0.106*** -0.0673***
(0.00387) (0.00405)
notFaceToFaceOne -0.149*** -0.112***
(0.00392) (0.00419)
lagTFP 0.0338*** 0.0392*** 0.0341*** 0.0334***
(0.0128) (0.0129) (0.0130) (0.0128)
Constant 2.027*** 2.046*** 2.095*** 2.187***
(0.0318) (0.0318) (0.0317) (0.0320)
Observations 81,048 81,048 81,048 81,048
R-squared 0.372 0.374 0.379 0.383
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parantheses below the co-
efficient estimates. Demographic controls include sex, age, race, education,
whether in a union, whether a citizen, education, and industry and time
fixed effects. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, ***1%
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Table 1.7: OLS Estimates on Offshoring and Offshorability Interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES LnWage LnWage LnWage LnWage
Lag Mat. Offshoring 0.0133 0.0481 -0.0197 0.0252
(0.124) (0.127) (0.124) (0.127)
Lag Ser. Offshoring 0.113** 0.112** 0.186*** 0.187***
(0.0496) (0.0496) (0.0511) (0.0511)
Offshorability -0.172*** -0.160*** -0.127*** -0.111***
(0.00410) (0.00912) (0.00783) (0.0116)
Lag Mat. Off. * Offshorability -0.0658 -0.0863*
(0.0448) (0.0449)
Lag Ser. Off. * Offshorability -0.153*** -0.157***
(0.0242) (0.0243)
lagTFP 0.0344*** 0.0334*** 0.0342*** 0.0329**
(0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129)
Constant 2.127*** 2.121*** 2.103*** 2.095***
(0.0318) (0.0321) (0.0320) (0.0324)
Observations 81,048 81,048 81,048 81,048
R-squared 0.382 0.382 0.382 0.382
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parantheses below the coefficient
estimates. Demographic controls include sex, age, race, education, whether in a
union, whether a citizen, education, and industry and time fixed effects. Signifi-
cant at * 10%, ** 5%, ***1%
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Table 1.8: Robustness Check based on Skill Classification
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES LnWage LnWage LnWage
Lag Mat. Offshoring -0.204 -0.0709 -0.249**
(0.126) (0.121) (0.125)
Lag Ser. Offshoring 0.0785 -0.0859* -0.0977*
(0.0486) (0.0514) (0.0515)
HighSkillOccOne 0.418*** 0.358*** 0.305***
(0.0140) (0.0117) (0.0176)
MedSkillOccOne 0.178*** 0.169*** 0.116***
(0.00945) (0.00811) (0.0121)
lagMatOutHighSkillOne 0.201*** 0.272***
(0.0639) (0.0640)
lagMatOutMedSkillOne 0.231*** 0.283***
(0.0486) (0.0486)
lagSerOutHighSkillOne 0.325*** 0.344***
(0.0330) (0.0332)
lagSerOutMedSkillOne 0.185*** 0.203***
(0.0260) (0.0261)
lagTFP 0.0247* 0.0243* 0.0209*
(0.0127) (0.0126) (0.0126)
Constant 2.011*** 2.028*** 2.060***
(0.0312) (0.0311) (0.0315)
Observations 81,107 81,107 81,107
R-squared 0.407 0.408 0.408
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes
All regression has demographic control and time and industry fixed effect
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parantheses below the co-
efficient estimates. Demographic controls include sex, age, race, education,
whether in a union, whether a citizen, education, and industry and time fixed
effects. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, ***1%
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1.8 Appendix
Table 1.9: OLS Estimates of Offshoring on Skill-Premium
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES LnWage LnWage LnWage LnWage
Lag Mat. Offshoring -0.166 -0.0729
(0.105) (0.122)
Lag Ser. Offshoring 0.0938** 0.0800
(0.0420) (0.0487)
HighSkillOccOne 0.400*** 0.400*** 0.400***
(0.00639) (0.00639) (0.00639)
Med Skill Occupation 0.183*** 0.183*** 0.183***
(0.00408) (0.00408) (0.00408)
College 0.614*** 0.427*** 0.427*** 0.427***
(0.00542) (0.00611) (0.00611) (0.00611)
SomeCollege 0.194*** 0.134*** 0.135*** 0.134***
(0.00444) (0.00441) (0.00441) (0.00441)
lagTFP 0.0345*** 0.0235* 0.0215* 0.0232*
(0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0123) (0.0126)
Age1624 -0.363*** -0.341*** -0.341*** -0.341***
(0.00895) (0.00880) (0.00880) (0.00880)
Age2539 -0.109*** -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.101***
(0.00405) (0.00394) (0.00394) (0.00394)
Married 0.182*** 0.158*** 0.158*** 0.158***
(0.00564) (0.00550) (0.00550) (0.00550)
Male 0.250*** 0.247*** 0.247*** 0.247***
(0.00425) (0.00413) (0.00413) (0.00413)
Union 0.0658*** 0.103*** 0.102*** 0.102***
(0.0107) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105)
Full-Time 0.137*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.124***
(0.0159) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0157)
Citizen 0.172*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.138***
(0.00569) (0.00551) (0.00551) (0.00551)
White 0.0438*** 0.0234*** 0.0233*** 0.0233***
(0.00556) (0.00542) (0.00542) (0.00542)
Constant 1.957*** 2.001*** 1.993*** 1.994***
(0.0313) (0.0306) (0.0308) (0.0309)
Observations 81,107 81,107 81,107 81,107
R-squared 0.368 0.403 0.403 0.403
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parantheses below the
coefficient estimates. Regressions include industry and time fixed effects.
Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, ***1%
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Chapter 2
Import Competition and Crime: A
Study of US Top Trading Partners
2.1 Introduction
In the past few decades, there has been a phenomenal growth in world trade. Lowering of
trade barriers, advancement in information technology and reduction in transportation costs
have all contributed to the growth of trade among countries. As a result, the effect of trade
on workers and local labor markets has been a fiercely debated topic. This has picked up
further steam in the US especially because of the the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and the tremendous rise of China in the global market. This has resulted in an
increased import share of the US as a fraction of its GDP as shown in Figure 2.1. From
1991 to 2006, the import share of the US has increased from 10 percent to 18 percent. Most
of this increase can be attributed to its top six trading partners: Canada, China, Mexico,
Germany, Japan and South Korea.1
As a result of such an increase in US imports, a large number of growing literature has
looked at the direct and indirect consequences of trade on labor markets. Recent empirical
literature has shown that increase in import competition leads to reduction in wages and
employment for workers that are more exposed to import competition.2 In addition, the
worsening labor market outcomes in terms of wages and employment for a large number of
1Figure 2.2 shows the trend of imports from these countries.
2See Borjas et al. (1992), Ebenstein et al. (2014), Pierce and Schott (2012)
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workers may lead to other negative ancillary effects. This paper aims to study the effect
of these increase in import competition on property and violent crimes at the local labor
market level.3
The most recent wave of literature has mostly focused on the effects of Chinese import
exposure. The economic reforms carried out in China after 1979 has significantly increased
the exports industry in China. Chinese exports received a further bolstering after it joined
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. This has resulted in a rapid growth of
Chinese imports in the US. Furthermore, Chinese imports have been increasing at a faster
pace compared to imports from other low-income countries. Autor et al. (2013) calls this the
“China Syndrome” and their study shows that the import competition from China explains
about one-quarter of the aggregate decline in U.S. manufacturing industry and also leads to
an increase in government benefits payments in markets that have high exposure to Chinese
imports. Likewise, Pierce and Schott (2012) exploit the accession of China to the WTO
and show that the industries that had a higher exposure to Chinese imports experienced
employment loss as plants shifted their labor intensive production process to China.
This has led to a spike in studies analyzing the ancillary consequences of increasing import
competition from China. For instance, Feler and Senses (2015) show that Chinese import
competition leads to a lower quality of public good provision, reduces business activities,
decreases housing prices and increases property crimes. Likewise, Che and Xu (2015) find
that the number of violent and property crimes at the county level increases as China’s
import exposure increases. This paper contributes to the growing literature on the ancillary
effect of import competition by comparing the impact of the import exposure of China with
the other top five import partners of the US on crime rates. To my knowledge, this is the
first study that looks at the effect of import exposure on crime of these other countries at
the local labor market level.
My study builds on the approach of Autor et al. (2013) by exploiting the variation
in import exposure because of the differences in industry specialization across local labor
markets. I examine three four year periods: 1992-1996, 1997-2001, 2002-2006, to study the
effect of increasing import competition on property crimes (burglary, larceny, motor vehicle
3I define local labor markets in terms of commuting zones in this study.
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theft, and arson) and violent crimes (murder, rape, assault and robberies) at the commuting
zone level in the US. I find that a $1000 increase in Chinese import competition per worker
increases the property crime rates by about 3 percent. In contrast, I find a negative relation
for import exposure from Germany, Japan and Korea, but the evidence is not strong. In
addition, I find no effect on violent crimes from increasing import exposure from any of the
countries in the study.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 discusses the import
competition from the six countries of interest, section 3 talks about the literature on import
competition and crime, section 4 looks at the identification and empirical specification.
Section 5 provides the results and section 6 looks at the possible channel of the effect.
Robustness checks are provided in section 7 and section 8 concludes.
2.2 Import Competition
According to the World Development Indicators database, in the 1990s, exports grew
nearly 140 percent faster than global GDP. The globalized nature of trade has also changed
the trade patterns of the US. Its import share of GDP has increased over the past two
decades. Among other aspects, this increase in import share can be attributed to several
initiatives US has undertaken on trade negotiations such as the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) in the early 1990s, and inclusion of more countries in the World Trade
Organization(WTO). The higher share of imports to GDP to the US is mainly attributable to
its six largest trading partners: Canada, China, Mexico, Germany, Japan and South Korea.
This section will look at the changes in the imports of the US from these six countries.
2.2.1 China
China instituted a series of economic reforms beginning in 1979.4 It allowed for special
economic zones (SEZ) along its coast that helped attract foreign investment and boosted its
exports. The number of SEZs increased from 20 in 1991 to 150 by 2010 (Autor et al., 2016a).
4Some of these reforms were ownership incentives for farmers, and economic control of enterprises to
provincial and local governments (Morrison, 2013)
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As a result, according to World Bank, their share of inflows of foreign direct investment
increased from an average of 0.7% of GDP in the 1980’s to about 4.2% of its GDP in 2000’s.
Their share of world manufacturing exports has also risen from about 2.3% in 1991 to about
15% in 2007. Consequently, there has been a rapid increase in U.S. imports from China
which stood at about $26 billion in 1992 to over $350 billion in 2008. The rate of imports
from China has grown faster after it joined the WTO as shown in Figure 2.2. However, it
is important to note that the increase in imports across industries is not uniform – some
industries imports has increased substantially more compared to other industries. One of
the highest imports in 1991 was in the Games, toys and dolls manufacturing industry. Its
imports was $3.2 billion in 1991, which rose to $11.8 billion in 2000 and to $20.2 billion
in 2007. Likewise, machinery and apparel industry has seen a massive growth in Chinese
exports.
2.2.2 Canada
The US and Canada agreed on a free trade agreement in 1987 which was signed by
the leaders of both the countries in early 1988. This agreement came to be known as the
Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA). The agreement planned to phase out various
trade restrictions in different phases over a ten year period. In 1994, Mexico joined the
agreement with the signing of NAFTA. Canadian imports increases from 91 billion in 1991
to about 310 billion in 2006. Panel C of Table 2.1 shows the highest and lowest import
industries for the years 1992, 2001 and 2006. For all those years, crude petroleum and
natural gas and motor vehicles and passenger car bodies were the top exporting industries
for Canda to the US.5 The lowest imports were mainly from the labaratory apparatus and
lace and warp knit fabric mills. Furthermore, ice-cream and frozen desserts saw the highest
growth in imports, whereas cellulosic manmade fibers saw a decline in imports.
5For these years, motor vehicle parts and accessories was the third highest import industry.
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2.2.3 Mexico
The signing of NAFTA in 1992 eliminated many tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade
between Mexico and the US. The domestic reform in Mexico in the mid-1980s after the peso
crisis saw an increase in Mexican export industries. The US has always been Mexico’s biggest
trading partner. For instance, in 1993, 83.3 percent of Mexico’s exports and 71.2 percent of
Mexico’s imports were with the US.6. For the US, from 1991 to 2006, imports from Mexico
rose by 393% from about 40 billion in 1993 to 201 billion in 2006. Crude petroleum and
natural gas and motor vehicles and passenger car bodies has been the highest importing
industries of the US in the past two decades as shown in panel B of Table 2.1.7 During that
period, one of its fastest growing industries was the gypsum products, whereas industries
such as cottonseed oil mills and printing trades machinery and equipments saw a decline.
However, it is important to note that the growth rate of imports from Mexico declined in
the later years, accounting for only 46 percent growth from 2000 to 2006.
2.2.4 Germany
After the Berlin wall fell, the reunification of East and West Germany started a new era
of partnership between the US and Germany. In 1992, BMW opened its first factory in the
US. During the period of 1991-2006, imports from Germany increased from about 27 billion
to 91 billion, a factor of more than 230%.8 For my period of interest, the highest importing
industries were motor vehicle and passenger car bodies followed by motor vehicles part and
accessories as shown in panel D of table 2.1. In addition, truck and bus bodies industries
saw the highest growth in imports, whereas knit outwear mills saw a decline in imports.
2.2.5 South Korea
Korea has seen a massive growth in its GDP in the past four decades. In the 1960s,
its GDP per capita was comparable to other poor countries; however, by 2004, its nominal
GDP was over a trillion dollars. The depreciation of the South Korean Won after the Asian
6This, however, accounted for less than 10 percent of U.S. imports and exports (Burfisher et al., 2001)
7In all these years, household audio and video equipment was the third highest importing industry.
8By 2015, US took over France as Germany’s biggest trading partner.
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financial crisis in 1997 increased the exports from South Korea. It is the sixth largest trading
partner of the US, with the imports from the country increasing by more than 160% from
about 18 billion in 1992 to 48 billion in 2006. The highest import industry of the US for
South Korean good was the semiconductors and related devices in 1992, but was overtaken
by motor vehicle and passenger car bodies by 2000.
2.2.6 Japan
Trade relations between Japan and US has not always been a smooth ride. The late
70s and early 80s saw a massive increase in imports of Japanese-made vehicles to the US.
The competing pressure and falling sales of the US auto industry motivated the Reagan
administration to persuade Japan to agree on voluntary export restraints in 1981. The
Plaza Accord agreement in 1985 agreed on depreciating the US dollars to the Japanese
Yen and other countries to ease import competition on US industries. Japan responded by
establishing manufacturing plants in the US. These issue had been a major area of trade
negotiations in the 1990s, with the Clinton administration negotiating the “United States-
Japan Framework for a New Economic Partnership”. Nonetheless, Japan remains one of the
major trading partners of the US. Japanese exports to the US rose by 56% from 96 billion in
1991 to 150 billion in 2006. Compared to the other trading partners of the US, the growth of
Japanese imports has been modest.9 However, Cooper (2010) argues the relative importance
of the US to Japan’s trade because the Chinese exports to the US uses a significant portion
of Japanese exports to China. As with most of the other developed countries, industries
with the highest Japanese imports are motor vehicle and passenger car bodies and motor
vehicle parts and accessories. It is also interesting to note that textile bags saw the highest
growth in exports, whereas prefabricated metal buildings and components saw a decline in
their imports.
9One of the major reasons for this is the sluggish growth of the Japanese economy for the past two decades
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2.3 Import Competition and Crime
For the US, on average, the crime rates have been declining. Levitt (2004) pointed
out four possible reasons for the decline in crime rates since the 1990s: 1) Increase in the
number of police, 2) rising prison population, 3) receding crack epidemic, and 4) legalization
of abortion. However, a lot of variation still exists at the local level.
Among other things, this variation in the local level can be attributed to unemployment
rate. Most early studies that studied the relationship between unemployment and crime
rates have found a small positive impact of unemployment on property crimes but not violent
crimes (Freeman, 1999; Piehl, 1998). Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) look at the variation
in state level and find that a 1 percentage point increase in unemployment leads to an increase
in property crime rates between 2.8 percent and 5 percent. Likewise, Gould et al. (2002) using
a panel of US counties look at the “at risk” group of young, unskilled and low-educated males
and find that one percentage point increase in unemployment would lead to a 1-2 percent
increase in property crimes.
A number of recent literature focuses on the ancillary effect of trade liberalization and
import competition. Carneiro et al. (2015) look at the effects of trade liberalization in
Brazil and crime rates at the local labor market. They find that regions that experienced
more import shocks also experienced large relative increase in crime rates in the medium
term. However, they find that the effects disappeared in the long-term. Likewise, Iyer and
Topalova (2014) study the case of trade shocks and crime in India. They find that trade
shocks increased relative poverty, which also increased the incidence of violent crimes and
property crimes. Furthermore, many studies have built on the study of Autor et al. (2013)
by looking at the effect of Chinese import exposure. Feler and Senses (2015) find negative
effect on public good provision and business activity and a positive effect on property crimes
as a result of increasing Chinese import exposure. Specifically, they find that an increase
of $1000 in Chinese import exposure increases property crimes by 3 percent. Similar to the
study, Che and Xu (2015) also looks at the effect on property and violent crimes and find a
positive impact on both violent and property crimes at the county level. This paper builds
on these papers and looks at the effect of import exposure of other top trading partners of
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the US.
2.4 Identification and Empirical Specification
2.4.1 Commuting Zones
Commuting zone encompasses the idea of local labor markets. As Topel (1986) pointed
out, local labor markets should be motivated by the idea that both the employers and
workers interact within a space bounded by places of work and places of residence. Thus,
the ideal geographical definition of a local labor market should be determined by the strong
commuting ties within the local labor market, and weak commuting ties across the local
labor market.
Empirical studies look at various geographical delineation to study the local labor mar-
kets. For instance, Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) studies the effect of unemployment
on crime at the state level. This geographic delineation provides various drawbacks because
it is not evident why local labor market dynamics should be bounded by state lines.10 Fur-
thermore, many states are large enough to be characterized with within-state heterogeneity.
As a result, most studies also look at the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) to study
local labor markets because it may overlap state and county boundries as it covers a city and
their suburbs. Although it has an economic appeal, it only covers major urban population
centers and does not cover rural areas. Likewise, looking at counties may provide a greater
geographic detail, but it limits the market to be within a single state and maybe too small
to define one labor market as many different counties may cluster to form a single labor
market.
Thus, for the purpose of my analysis, I use the concept of commuting zones(c-zone) to
define local labor markets as they are not limited to any political boundaries and cover
both rural and urban areas. They have been defined by Tolbert and Sizer (1996) as clusters
of counties that are characterized by strong commuting ties within the c-zone. For the
10There are many urban areas overlapping with the state lines (e.g. New York City/Jersey City and
Washington D.C/Arlington, Kansas City MO/Kansas city MS), notably because cities developed on both
sides of rivers that serve as state boundaries(Dorn, 2009).
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mainland US, the 1990 data provides 741 commuting zones, with the average commuting
zone consisting of four counties (Dorn, 2009). Further, given that c-zones are based on
commuting distance, it provides with the notion that employers and workers should be
located within commuting distances to be affected by any changes in the labor market.
For my study, I get a variation in import exposure across c-zones based on the industry
specialization and employment across the c-zones. As a result, I hypothesize that c-zones
that are specialized in industries with high import competition should see an increasing rates
of crime if import competition deteriorates labor market conditions. Likewise, if the import
competition improves the labor market conditions, I expect to see declining crime rates.
2.4.2 Measuring Import Exposure
Data on imports to the US are collected at the industry level and are not available at
the local labor market level. I employ the method used by Autor et al. (2013) to study
exposure to import competition at the c-zone level. The exposure to import competition is
defined as the change in import exposure per worker in a commuting zone, where imports
are apportioned to a commuting zone based on its share of national industry employment.
Mathematically, it can be written as:
∆Exposurect =
∑
j
Ljct
Lct
∗ ∆importsjt
Ljt
(2.1)
where Ljct is the total employment of industry j in c-zone c in year t, Lct is the total
employment of the c-zone c at time t, Ljt is the national employment of industry j in time t,
and ∆importsjt is the change in national U.S. imports in industry j between time t and t+5.
The measure weights national changes in national imports per worker between time t and
t+ 5 in industry j by the share of a c-zone employment accounted for by industry j. This is
then aggregated over all industries, which will yield a c-zone specific measure of change in
import competition. The variation across c-zone results from the variation in imports across
different industries, and the variation in industry specialization and industry employment
structure of the c-zone. A higher value of ∆Exposurect indicates a greater exposure per
worker to import competition.
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2.4.3 Instrumental Variable
One of the concerns in estimating the effect of import exposure on local labor markets is
that the rise in imports may be correlated with the industry import demand shocks. This
may result in a biased OLS estimate. Therefore, to correctly identify the casual effect and
to isolate the supply-side channel, I apply the instrumental variable approach. Here, I follow
Autor et al. (2013) by instrumenting the import exposure by looking at the exports of the
country of interest to other high income countries over the same time period and lagging
employment by five years to mitigate the effect of any anticipated response to contempo-
raneous employment levels to future Chinese imports and thus reducing simultaneity bias.
The instrument can be represented as
∆IVct =
∑
j
Ljct−5
Ljt−5
∗ ∆imports
others
jt
Lct−5
(2.2)
where the subscripts represent the same meanings as used to define the change in exposure
in equation 3.1. The only two difference with equation 3.1 is that the change in exports now
consists of imports of other high-income countries, and the start of period employment is
now lagged by five years.
2.4.4 Data and Summary Statistics
For my analysis, I aggregate the county level data at the c-zone level to study the impact
on local labor market level. I then link the import exposure measure with the county-level
violent and property crimes aggregated at the c-zone level. I use the crosswalk developed by
Autor et al. (2013) to match the county-level data with the commuting zones.
My crime data comes from the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) database issued by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). These data are collected at the reporting agency level
and then aggregated to the county level. The county level data includes crimes divided into
various subcategories. I divide the crimes into two categories: i) violent and ii) property.
Violent crimes include murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robberies and
aggravated assaults. The property crimes include burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft and
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arson. The crime data is computed at per 1000 population for standardization. I aggregate
the county level data to commuting zone level. However, it is important to note the two major
limitations of the data. First, the program administered by the FBI is voluntary, therefore
some agencies may not report the crimes. This leads to many missing observations. Second,
it only contains data that were either reported or discovered by the agency; hence, I cannot
account for crimes that were not reported. Nonetheless, the crime literature uses the data
source extensively. For my analysis, I only include the commuting zones that has complete
crime data. Therefore, for the time periods in my analysis, 1992-1996, 1997-2001, and 2002-
2006, I only include those c-zones if all the counties within that c-zone report crime data
(both violent and property) at the start of the period and at the end of the period. My
dependent variable is constructed by taking the difference of log of crime at the end of the
period and the log of crime at the beginning of the period.
The trade data comes from the UN Comtrade database that provides information on the
product at the six-digit Harmonized System (HS 1992). I match these data with the SIC87
industry code by using the crosswalk provided by Autor et al. (2013). To create the import
exposure measure, I need data on total employment of industry j at the national level, total
employment of the commuting zone, and the total employment for each industry j in a
commuting zone. I get data for the above measures from the Census County of Business
Pattern (CBP) at the county-level. I then aggregate this at the commuting-zone level.11
I also control for various county level demographic measures that may affect the crime
rates. Following Levitt (1997), I control for the percentage of population that are college
educated, the percentage of people that are below 25 years of age, and the percentage of
people that are black. The data for all these variables comes from the census. For education,
I only have data on decennial census; therefore, I interpolate to get the data for in-between
11CBP provides the information for each year starting from 1986. However, for the years in my sample,
they define industries initially at the SIC87 level, and later at different NAICS level based on the year.
Thus, following Autor et al. (2013), I convert all industry into SIC87 code. For instance, the CBP data
from 1992-1997 uses SIC 87 industry classification, NAICS97 industry code is used for years 1998-2002, and
NAICS02 code is used for data 2003-2007. Therefore, I initially convert all NAICS02 code to NAICS97 using
concordance table provided by the Census Bureau. I then use the concordance file provided by Dorn that
creates weight for NAICS97 codes to be split into two or more SIC87 groups and use the same weights to
calculate the employment at the SIC87 industry level. Therefore, my data will have consistent SIC87 level
for all industries in different years
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years.
Table 2.2 provides the summary statistics which illustrates considerable variation in im-
port exposure and percentage change in property and violent crimes across commuting zones.
Both property and violent crime has been decreasing during my sample period. Property
crime have fallen by about 8 percent whereas violent crime has decreased by 4.3 percent.
The average c-zone experienced a $1047, $599 and $570 per worker import exposure from
Canada, Mexico and China respectively. Likewise average c-zone exposure from both Ger-
many and Japan were over $100 per worker, with the 75th percentile of c-zones exposure
being over $200 per worker.
I also report my subsamples with top 20 percent and bottom 20 percent c-zone exposure
with respect to Chinese and Canadian import exposure separately as seen in Table 2.3 and
2.4.12 The top 20 percentile commuting zone exposures to Chinese imports had a mean
exposure of $2834, whereas the the top 20 percentile c-zones for Canadian import exposure
had an average exposure of $5786. However, it is interesting to note that both property
crimes and violent crimes was increasing for the top 20 percentile c-zones with exposures
to Chinese imports, but the crimes were decreasing for the top 20 percentile c-zones with
exposure to Canadian imports. Likewise, the bottom 20 percentile c-zone of Chinese import
exposure had a higher exposure to import competition than the bottom 20 percentile c-
zones with exposure to Chinese import competition. Furthermore, property crimes have
been decreasing for the c-zones, while there is a slight increase in violent crimes for both set
of bottom 20 percentile c-zones. Also, comparing the bottom and top exposure c-zones for
Chinese imports, we see that the property crimes has been increasing for c-zones with more
exposure, whereas property crimes have been decreasing for c-zones with low exposure.
2.4.5 First-Difference specification
For my analysis I use the first-difference approach, which elinimates any unobserved time-
invariant hetereogeneity among the c-zones. I then stack the first differences of the three
time periods (1992-1996, 1997-2001, and 2002-2006), and include separate time dummies for
12The choice of these countries were based on the mean exposure of import competition.
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each period. The stacked first difference model is similar to fixed-effect models with slightly
less restrictive assumption made on the error term.13 Furthermore, this method also removes
any time invariant heterogeneity between import competition and crime; thus, ruling out any
time-invariant factors that affect crime rates within a given c-zone. The inclusion of time
dummy captures factors that have a time-varying effect on crime common to all c-zones.
My primary regression specification takes the following form:
∆crimect = β0 + β1∆Exposurect + β2Mct + β3Xct + δreg + γt + ct (2.3)
where ∆crimect is the difference of crime rate for c-zone c between beginning of period and
end of period. ∆Exposurect is the key explanatory variable of interest and represents the
change in exposure per-worker of c-zone c to import competition, Mct is the start of the period
c-zone employment that was accounted for by manufacturing, γt indicates time-dummies for
each period, and δreg controls for census region fixed effects. The vector Xct controls for
the c-zone’s start of the period demographic variables. These include the percentage of
population that is college educated, the share of population between 18-25 years, and the
share of population that is black.
During my period of analysis, a host of studies has talked about the changes in the broader
economy, specifically the declining manufacturing employment as a result of technological
changes (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Dorn et al., 2015). Thus, all of these controls allow the
changes in outcomes to be a function of initial conditions, time trends to vary by geographic
regions, and the aggregate time period to vary by five years. I cluster my standard errors at
the state level.
2.5 Result
In this section, I discuss my findings on the impact of import exposure from the top six
trading partner for the US on crime at the c-zone level. In discussing the magnitude of the
findings, I evaluate coefficient estimates for a $1000 increase in import exposure per worker
13Please see footnote 26 of Autor et al. (2013)
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at the c-zone. I will first present the OLS results, then look at the IV results for the case of
China. I will then highlight the potential mechanism through which import exposure affects
crime.
2.5.1 OLS Result
I present my OLS findings in table 2.5 and 2.6. For both the tables, the dependent
variables is the change in log of property crime rates in columns 1 and 2, and the change in
the log violent crime rates in columns 2 and 3 between 1992-1996, 1997-2001, and 2002-2006.
Columns 1 and 3 controls for share of manufacturing employment in the c-zone, time fixed
effects and census region fixed effects. I introduce additional demographic controls in column
2 and 4 that may potentially impact crime such as the share of population under 25, share
of population that is black and the share of population that has a college degree. All the
standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Panel A of Table 2.5 shows the results for China. The first column, with baseline controls,
show that a $1000 increase in import exposure per worker increased the c-zone property crime
rate by about 2.06 percent. Introducing demographic controls in column 2, I find that it
slightly decreases my point estimates, but the results are still significant at the 5 percent
level. For Canada and Mexico the results are presented in Panel B and C in Table 2.5. For
Mexico, the results show that an increase in Mexican import exposure increases the property
crimes by 0.2 percent with the baseline controls. The estimate decreases to 0.08 percent for
property crimes when I introduce additional demographic controls in the model. However,
the estimates are not statistically significant. The effect for Canada for property crimes
decreases by 0.3 percent, but I can not reject the null hypothesis of no effect.
The estimation for Germany, Japan and Korea show the opposite effect for property
crimes compared to China. Panel A of Table 2.6 shows the results for Germany in Panel A.
I find that a $1000 increase in exposure from Germany reduces the c-zone property crimes
by 4.8 percent with my baseline controls. The inclusion of demographic controls reduces
the point estimate to 4.5 percent, but the result is still significant at the 5 percent level.
In addition, the results for Japan, as presented in Panel B, shows that a $1000 increase in
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Japanese import exposure decreases property crimes by 2.8 percent with baseline controls,
which decreases slightly to 2.7 percent with the inclusion of demographic controls. The
estimation for Korea is reported in Panel C, and it is comparable to that of Germany. Increase
in import exposure from Korea reduces the property crimes by 4.5 percent in column 1. In
column 2, when I introduce additional demographic controls, the point estimate decreases
slightly to 4.0 percent, but it is still statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.5 and 2.6 shows the point estimates for violent crimes.
The magnitude of the effect are small for China, Canada and Mexico as compared to their
effect on property crimes. Further, violent crimes are negatively correlated with the import
exposure of China and Canada, and positively correlated with those of Mexico. However,
none of the estimates are statistically significant. In comparision, the magnitude of the effect
for Germany, Japan and Korea are considerably larger than those for Chiana, Canada and
Mexico. The results are presented in Panel A, B and C of Table 2.6. Similar to the effect
on property crimes, I find a negative effect on violent crimes as a result of exposure from
the three countries. The magnitude is slightly higher for Germany and Korea compared to
that for Japan. For instance, a $1000 increase in Germany import exposure, reduces violent
crimes by 6 percent compared to 4.2 percent for Korea and 1.5 percent for Japan. However,
none of the estimates are significant even at the 10 percent level.
The results are interesting as I only find effect on property crimes but not violent crimes.
This give further plausibility to my hypothesis that people resort to criminal behavior as
a result of financial pressures of lower cumulative earnings and job loss as the potential
financial benefit of property crimes are higher than those for violent crimes.
2.5.2 Instrumental Variable and 2SLS Results
One of the concerns when working with the import exposure from China is that there
maybe a reverse causality problem. For instance, c-zones with deteriorating economic poten-
tial and higher inclination for crime growth may be the ones that experience more exposure
from Chinese import competition. Therefore, to mitigate the problem of demand shocks
on Chinese imports, I need to emphasize the growth in imports from China to the US was
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supply-driven and not US demand-driven. To resolve this issue, I employ the plausible ex-
ogenous variation developed by Autor et al. (2013). I look at the change in other high income
countries imports of Chinese goods as an instrument for US changes in imports per worker as
shows in equation 3.2. It has also been lagged with five year employment levels to mitigate
the possibility that employment would adjust to an anticipated increase in Chinese imports.
The findings are presented in the table 2.7. In column 1, I show the second stage estimated
results, controlling for my baseline controls. I find a positive effect of a 3 percent increase
in property crimes. I also present my first stage F-statistics and the partial R-square, which
confirms the validity of the model. In column 2, I include additional demographic controls.
My results are similar to column 1, with only a slight increase in point estimate. Likewise,
the result from the first stage estimate of the F-stat and the partial R-square confirms the
validity of the model. Hence, even when I employ an instrumental variable approach, I
do find that property crimes increased by about 3 percent as a result of $1000 increase in
exposure from Chinese imports.
2.6 Potential Channel
One of the potential channels through which the trade induced shocks can increase the
property crime rates is through financial pressures on worker through lower cumulative earn-
ings. Recently, a number of studies have pointed out the negative effects on employment and
earnings of Chinese import competition.14 Thus, it is a possibility that I find a positive effect
on property crimes as a result of Chinese import exposure because of either i) the resulting
loss of jobs , which results in higher unemployment or ii) a reduction in wages, which lowers
the workers lifetime cumulative earnings. Both these possibilities would induce a person to
commit property crimes as it then increases their relative benefit of it.
I test the first channel in this paper: the increase in crime is because the exposure of
import competition increases unemployment at the c-zone level.15 I provide the regression
14Please see Autor et al. (2013), Acemoglu and Autor (2011)
15The data available to look at the effect on wages at a commuting zone is not reliable (Autor et al., 2013),
therefore it will be a subject of further study
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results using the following estimation equation:
∆crimect = β0 + β1∆URatect + β2Xct + δreg + γt + ct (2.4)
where ∆crimect is the difference in the log of property crime rate for c-zone c between
beginning of period and end of period. ∆URatect is the average change in unemployment
rate in the c-zone γt indicates time-dummies for each period, and δreg controls for census
region fixed effects. The vector Xct controls for the c-zone’s start of the period demographic
variables. These include the percentage of population that is college educated, the share of
population between 18-25 years, and the share of population that is black.
The findings are reported in table 2.8. In the first column, I do find a positive effect on
property crimes as a result of increasing unemployment, however these are not statistically
significant. In column 2, I include controls for various demographic variables and find that
unemployment rate has a statistically significant positive effect on property crimes. This
leads credibility to my mechanism.
Therefore, I need to look at the effect of import exposure from the country of interest on
the unemployment rate. I do that by estimating the following equation:
∆URatect = β0 + β1∆Exposurect + β2Xct + δreg + γt + ct (2.5)
where ∆URatect is the change in unemployment rate in the commuting zone, ∆Exposurect
is the commuting zone exposure to import competition as specified in equation 3.1, and all
other controls are the same as specified in equation 2.4.
The estimation is provided in table 2.9 and table 2.10. Here I summarize the results in
terms of Chinese exposure and ‘other’ countries exposure given that Chinese exposure had
a positive impact on crime and ‘other’ countries had a negative impact on crime.16.
China Panel A of table 2.9 shows the result for China. Including only the baseline
controls in column 1, I find a positive effect on unemployment as a result of increasing
Chinese exposure, but these are not statistically significant. In column 2, I include further
demographic controls. This increases my point estimate and the results are statistically
16Ohter countries here include Canada, Mexico, Germany, Japan and Korea
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significant. Hence, I can conclude that increasing Chinese exposure resulted in increasing
property crimes through the unemployment channel.
Other Countries Panel B of table 2.5 shows my results for Canada. Including only the
baseline controls in column 1, I find a statistically significant negative impact on employment
as a result of Canadian import exposure; however the statistical significance no longer exists
when I include demographic controls in column 2. For the case of Mexico, I do not find any
significant impact on unemployment. Estimates for Germany, Japan and Korea is presented
in panels A, B and C, respestively, in table 2.10. For all the three countries, I do not find
any significant results for unemployment. Therefore, there is a possibility that the decrease
in property crime rates as a result of increasing import exposure of these countries may work
through the wage effect. That is, increasing import exposure of these countries may result
in higher wages of workers, thus reducing their tendency to engage in criminal behavior.
2.7 Robustness Checks
I conduct two robustness checks. First, I cluster the standard errors at the c-zone level
rather than the state level. Second, I introduce state level fixed effect with standard errors
clustered at the c-zone level instead of a region fixed effect with standard errors clustered at
the state level as in my initial estimation.
Table 2.11 provides the first robustness check results for the four countries for which I
find statistical significant results in my analysis. The robustness check shows that the point
estimates are similar to my initial analysis with all the variables still significant. The second
robustness check are provided in table 2.12. The point estimates for China decreases by
about 0.1 percent, but they are still significant at the 5 percent level. For Germany, the point
estimates when I control for only the baseline specification increases by about 0.5 percent.
Adding additional controls, the point estimates increases slightly and are now significant at
the 10 percent level rather than at the 5 percent level as in my original estimation. For
Japan, the point estimates increases by 0.5 percent compared to my orginal estimation and
are still significant at the 1 percent level. The estimates decreases for Korea. Compared
to my original estimation, my point estimates decreases from a negative impact of about 4
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percent to a negative impact of about 3 percent. This is significant at the 10 percent level.
2.8 Conclusion
A wave of recent empirical studies have looked at the ancillary effects of import exposure
from China, including crime. To the best of my knowledge this is the first empirical study
that looks at effect of increasing import exposure on crime from the top trading partners
of US and compares that with the effect from Chinese exposure. I provide evidence that,
in contrast to Chinese import exposure that has a positive effect on property crimes, the
increasing import exposure from Germany, Japan and Korea has a negative effect on the
change in property crimes. Furthermore, there is no evidence linking the effect of import
exposure to changes in violent crimes from any of the countries studied here. I find no
significant effect from Canada and Mexico, albeit the mean exposure at the c-zone level is
higher from Canadian imports than Chinese imports.
The study also presents a possible channel through which this effect works. I show
that the increasing in Chinese exposure leads to increasing unemployment, thus raising
the financial pressure on workers. This induces workers to engage in property crimes. In
contrast, the negative impact on crime from Germany, Japan and Korea may be because of a
potential impact on wages of workers, which needs to be studied further. This paper provides
an interesting insight: increasing exposure from developing countries (such as China) has
the opposite effect than increasing exposure from developed countries (Germany, Japan
and Korea). A possible reason may be because of the types of imports that comes from
these countries. Table 2.1 provides further information on the highest and lowest import
industries from all the countries. As it can be noted, the imports of from China are mainly
concentrated in labor-intensive production industries. As a result, firms may respond to this
increasing import competition by offshoring these production to China, thus either putting
a downward pressure on wages of low-skilled workers or by laying off workers. This would
raise the financial pressures on workers, which induces people to engage in property crimes
for financial gain. On the other hand, most of the imports from developed countries are
concentrated in motor vehicle parts and accessories. Further analysis needs to be done in
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order to look at the potential effect of such imports.
Given these effects of a trade shock may work through the channels of financial pressures,
there are various policy implications. Given that financial stress and pressure may be a
potential channel, it would be interesting to look at the effect of unemployment insurance on
trade-induced increase in crime rates. Likewise, policies to help increase the human capital
accumulation for low-skill, low-wage workers may reduces these effects of import competition.
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Figure 2.1: US Import Share of GDP
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Table 2.1: Ranking imports by country
High Import Industries Low Import Industries
A:CHN
1992: Vitreous China Table,Leather and
Sheep-Lined Clothing
Plumbing and Heating, Manifold Busi-
ness Forms
2000: Leather and Sheep-lined Clothing,
Women’s Footwear, Games and Toys
Industrial Gases, Asphalt Felts
2006: Electronic Computers, Computer Stor-
age Devices
Primary Smelting Copper, Metal Ores
B:MEX
1992: Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas, Mo-
tor Vehicle and Passenger Car Bodies
Natural Processsed, and Imitation
Cheese, Kaolin and Ball Clay
2000: Motor Vehicle and Passenger Car Bod-
ies, Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas
Tanks and components, Mobile Homes
2006: Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas, Mo-
tor Vehicle and Passenger Car Bodies
Newspaper Printing, Products of coal
C:CAN
1992: Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas, Mo-
tor Vehicle and Passenger Car Bodies
Lab. Apparatus, Kaolin and Ball Clay
2000: Motor Vehicle and Passenger Car Bod-
ies, Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas
Phosphate Rock, Lab. Apparatus
2006: Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas, Mo-
tor Vehicle and Passenger Car Bodies
Ordance Accessories, Lace and Warp Knit
Fabric Mills
D:GER
1992: Motor vehicle and passenger car bodies,
motor vehicle parts and accessories
Wood Preserving, Electrical Work
2000: Motor vehicle and passenger car bodies,
motor vehicle parts and accessories
Logging, Drapery Hardware
2006: Motor vehicle and passenger car bodies,
motor vehicle parts and accessories
Uranium ores, Logging
E:JPN
1992: Motor vehicle and passenger car bodies,
motor vehicle parts and accessories
Wood Preserving, Logging
2000: Motor vehicle and passenger car bodies,
motor vehicle parts and accessories
Mobile Homes, Logging
2006: Motor vehicle and passenger car bodies,
motor vehicle parts and accessories
Logging, Cigarettes
F:KOR
1992: Semiconductors and Related Devices,
Household A&V Equipment
Lab. Apparatus, Imitation Cheese
2000: Motor vehicle and passenger car bodies,
Radio and TV Broadcasting equipment
Logging, Lab. Apparatus
2006: Motor vehicle and passenger car bodies,
Petroleum Refining
Logging, Cigarettes
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max P25 P75
LnChangeProperty 1319 -0.079 0.240 -1.795 1.654 -.189 .037
LnChangeViolent 1319 -0.043 0.404 -1.624 3.496 -.232 .123
CHN Imp Exp 1319 0.57 .857 -0.103 12.937 .104 .709
CAN Imp Exp 1319 1.047 2.074 -2.216 31.136 .263 1.029
GER Imp Exp 1319 0.162 .22 -0.374 3.767 .038 .201
JPN Imp Exp 1319 0.140 .421 -8.356 4.950 .008 .211
KOR Imp Exp 1319 0.083 .218 -1.199 3.008 .001 .106
MEX Imp Exp 1319 0.599 1.137 -1.529 17.112 .140 .638
Note: All import exposure are in $ 1000 per worker in the c-zone as defined in
equation 3.1
Table 2.3: Top 20% of county exposure: China and Canada
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: China
LnChangeViolent 94 .01 .315 -.97 1.01
LnChangeProperty 94 .026 .169 -.335 .576
CHN Imp Exp 94 2.834 1.541 1.79 12.937
Pct Black 94 10.729 14.177 .131 65.571
Pct College 94 14.506 4.541 9.1 29.5
Pct Below 25 94 33.78 2.859 25.659 45.976
Panel B: Canada
LnChangeViolent 94 -.024 .354 -.82 1.344
LnChangeProperty 94 -.086 .223 -1.08 .683
CAN Imp Exp 94 5.786 5.16 1.799 31.136
Pct Black 94 7.368 11.517 .112 65.571
Pct College 94 14.954 4.145 7.4 36.367
Pct Below 25 94 34.384 3.584 27.712 45.179
Notes: The table shows the top 20 percent commuting zone with
exposure to China and Canada (Panel A and Panel B respectively)
for the period 2002-2006. The demographic characteristics are at
the initial period level.
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Table 2.4: Bottom 20% of county exposure: China and Canada
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: China
LnChangeViolent 95 .064 .581 -1.624 3.496
LnChangeProperty 95 -.116 .253 -1.725 .519
CHN Imp Exp 95 .244 .121 .006 .432
Pct Black 95 3.93 6.553 0 31.12
Pct College 95 18.703 7.517 7.4 44.1
Pct Below 25 95 34.349 5.613 23.284 54.312
Panel B: Canada
LnChangeViolent 94 .025 .493 -1.316 3.496
LnChangeProperty 94 -.093 .27 -1.725 .874
CAN Imp Exp 94 .151 .097 -.338 .28
Pct Black 94 7.795 10.753 0 60.746
Pct College 94 19.473 6.948 10.4 42.5
Pct Below 25 94 33.374 4.896 23.284 54.312
Notes: The table shows the bottom 20 percent commuting zone
with exposure to China and Canada (Panel A and Panel B respec-
tively) for the period 2002-2006. The demographic characteristics
are at the initial period level.
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Table 2.5: OLS Estimates of Import Exposure to Crime
∆ ln(PropertyCrime) ∆ ln(ViolentCrime)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Panel A: China
CHN Imp Exp 0.0206** 0.0203** -0.00411 -0.00330
(0.00780) (0.00772) (0.0203) (0.0211)
Observations 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319
R-squared 0.121 0.129 0.017 0.031
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes
Panel B: Canada
CAN Imp Exp -0.00189 -0.00342 -0.000352 -0.00338
(0.00272) (0.00262) (0.00472) (0.00494)
Observations 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319
R-squared 0.118 0.127 0.017 0.032
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes
Panel C: Mexico
MEX Imp Exp 0.00221 0.000888 0.00707 0.00487
(0.00707) (0.00692) (0.0131) (0.0140)
Observations 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319
R-squared 0.118 0.126 0.017 0.032
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes
Notes: ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent
respectively. Constants are included in the model but are not reported.
Baseline controls include year fixed effects, region fixed effects and start
of period manufacturing share. Demographic controls include share of
population under 25, share of population that is black, and share of
population that has a college degree. All standard errors are clustered
at the state level.
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Table 2.6: OLS Estimates of Import Exposure to Crime
∆ ln(PropertyCrime) ∆ ln(ViolentCrime)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Panel A: Germany
GER Imp Exp -0.0484** -0.0456** -0.0634 -0.0608
(0.0221) (0.0224) (0.0879) (0.0903)
Observations 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319
R-squared 0.119 0.128 0.018 0.032
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes
Panel B: Japan
JPN Imp Exp -0.0284*** -0.0276*** -0.0156 -0.0134
(0.00875) (0.00821) (0.0303) (0.0316)
Observations 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319
R-squared 0.120 0.129 0.017 0.032
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes
Panel C: Korea
KOR Imp Exp -0.0458** -0.0407** -0.0505 -0.0426
(0.0205) (0.0195) (0.0578) (0.0591)
Observations 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319
R-squared 0.119 0.128 0.018 0.032
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes
Notes: ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent
respectively. Constants are included in the model but are not reported.
Baseline controls include year fixed effects, region fixed effects and start
of period manufacturing share. Demographic controls include share of
population under 25, share of population that is black, and share of pop-
ulation that has a college degree. All standard errors are clustered at the
state level.
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Table 2.7: 2SLS Estimate of Chinese exposure on crime
(1) (2)
VARIABLES LnChangeProperty LnChangeProperty
CHN Imp Exp 0.0336** 0.0337**
(0.0133) (0.0132)
Observations 1,319 1,319
R-squared 0.119 0.128
Baseline Controls Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes
Partial R-square 0.563 0.561
F-stat 69.5 70.05
Notes: ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10
percent respectively. Constants are included in the model but are
not reported. Baseline controls include year fixed effects, region
fixed effects and start of period manufacturing share. Demographic
controls include share of population under 25, share of population
that is black, and share of population that has a college degree. All
standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Table 2.8: OLS Estimates of Unemployment on Property Crime
(1) (2)
VARIABLES LnChangeProperty LnChangeProperty
URate Change 0.00650 0.00866*
(0.00464) (0.00445)
Population Below 25 0.000766
(0.00231)
Percent College Edu -0.00768***
(0.00168)
Percent Black 0.000916
(0.000752)
Observations 1,319 1,319
R-squared 0.091 0.115
Year FE Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes
Notes: ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10
percent respectively. Constants are included in the model but are
not reported. All standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table 2.9: OLS Estimates of Exposure on Unemployment
(1) (2)
VARIABLES URate Change URate Change
Panel A: China
CHN Imp Exp 0.0839 0.104*
(0.0581) (0.0592)
Observations 1,319 1,319
R-squared 0.107 0.121
Demographic Control Yes
Panel B: Canada
CAN Imp Exp -0.0370* -0.0215
(0.0203) (0.0211)
Observations 1,319 1,319
R-squared 0.108 0.120
Demographic Control Yes
Panel C: Mexico
MEX Imp Exp -0.0240 -0.00253
(0.0387) (0.0374)
Observations 1,319 1,319
R-squared 0.106 0.119
Demographic Control Yes
Notes: ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at 1, 5
and 10 percent respectively. Constants are included in the
model but are not reported. All models include year fixed
effects, region fixed effects. All standard errors are clus-
tered at the state level.
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Table 2.10: OLS Estimates of Exposure on Unemployment
(1) (2)
VARIABLES URate Change URate Change
Panel A: Germany
GER Imp Exp 0.160 0.218
(0.211) (0.207)
Observations 1,319 1,319
R-squared 0.106 0.120
Demographic Control Yes
Panel B: Japan
JPN Imp Exp 0.0726 0.0828
(0.0723) (0.0724)
Observations 1,319 1,319
R-squared 0.106 0.120
Demographic Control Yes
Panel C: Korea
KOR Imp Exp 0.304 0.317
(0.233) (0.228)
Observations 1,319 1,319
R-squared 0.107 0.121
Demographic Control Yes
Notes: ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at 1, 5
and 10 percent respectively. Constants are included in the
model but are not reported. All models include year fixed
effects, region fixed effects. All standard errors are clus-
tered at the state level.
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Table 2.11: Robustness Checks for Import Exposure to Crime
(1) (2)
VARIABLES LnChangeProperty LnChangeProperty
Panel A: China
CHN Imp Exp 0.0206*** 0.0203**
(0.00768) (0.00772)
Observations 1,319 1,319
R-squared 0.121 0.129
Baseline Controls Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes
Panel B: Germany
GER Imp Exp -0.0484* -0.0456**
(0.0256) (0.0224)
Observations 1,319 1,319
R-squared 0.119 0.128
Baseline Controls Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes
Panel C: Japan
JPN Imp Exp -0.0284*** -0.0276***
(0.00802) (0.00821)
Observations 1,319 1,319
R-squared 0.120 0.129
Baseline Controls Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes
Panel D: Korea
KOR Imp Exp -0.0458** -0.0407**
(0.0212) (0.0195)
Observations 1,319 1,319
R-squared 0.119 0.128
Baseline Controls Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes
Notes: ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10
percent respectively. Constants are included in the model but are
not reported. Baseline controls include year fixed effects, region
fixed effects and start of period manufacturing share. Demographic
controls include share of population under 25, share of population
that is black, and share of population that has a college degree. All
standard errors are clustered at the cz level.
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Table 2.12: Robustness Checks for Import Exposure to Crime
(1) (2)
VARIABLES LnChangeProperty LnChangeProperty
Panel A: China
CHN Imp Exp 0.0192*** 0.0198***
(0.00718) (0.00733)
Observations 1,319 1,319
R-squared 0.164 0.168
Baseline Controls Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes
Panel B: Germany
GER Imp Exp -0.0513* -0.0464*
(0.0283) (0.0256)
Observations 1,319 1,319
R-squared 0.163 0.166
Baseline Controls Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes
Panel C: Japan
JPN Imp Exp -0.0336*** -0.0326***
(0.00809) (0.00777)
Observations 1,319 1,319
R-squared 0.164 0.168
Baseline Controls Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes
Panel D: Korea
KOR Imp Exp -0.0333 -0.0285*
(0.0213) (0.0161)
Observations 1,319 1,319
R-squared 0.162 0.165
Baseline Controls Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes
Notes: ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10
percent respectively. Constants are included in the model but are
not reported. Baseline controls include year fixed effects, state fixed
effects and start of period manufacturing share. Demographic con-
trols include share of population under 25, share of population that
is black, and share of population that has a college degree. All stan-
dard errors are clustered at the cz level.
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Chapter 3
Import Competition and Alcohol
Consumption at Local Labor Markets
3.1 Introduction
The increased nature of globalized trade has changed the the trade patterns of the US,
with both exports and imports comprising a much larger share in the US GDP. The import
share of US GDP has increased from 10 percent in 1992 to 18 percent in 2007. The rise of
China as the global manufacturing factory has significantly increased the volume of global
trade. The reforms carried out in China since the late 1970s has propelled China’s economic
growth, and by 2007 its manufacturing exports accounted for more than 10 percent of the
world market share.1 89 percent of the growth of imports to the US from low-income countries
can be accounted for by the growth of Chinese imports. Although trade is a positive sum
game, the spectacular rise of China allows us the opportunity to analyze the distributional
costs of trade to better understand the effects of a trade shock, and discuss the relevant
policies to make the adjustments smooth.
Two waves of economic literature are relevant to my study. First, the labor market
adjustment costs in terms of employment, wages and labor force participation from a trade
shock; second, the effect on health because of worsening labor market conditions. Recent
literature takes the exogenous growth of Chinese exports and find that it reduces wages and
employment; thus, lowering the cumulative lifetime earnings and labor force participation
1In 1991, China’s exports only accounted for about 2 percent of the world market share.
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among affected workers.2 These labor market outcomes of higher unemployment and lower
cumulative earnings also affects, among other things, the mental and physical well being of
workers. Studies have shown that worsening labor market outcomes and fear of job loss are
linked with greater stress and anxiety, increasing heart diseases and stroke, and a higher
mortality rate.3
The intersection of the two literature, shows many channels through which workers health
are affected by trade shocks. Studies by McManus and Schaur (2016) show that the increasing
import exposure from China in the US leads to an increase in workplace injuries and illness,
as firms try to cut costs by reducing spending on worker safety and increase the workload
of workers. Likewise, Hummels et al. (2015) also find that export shocks lead to higher
workloads which increases workplace injuries and hospitalizations. My paper contributes to
this literature by looking at additional health effects of trade shocks. More specifically, I
hypothesize that the worsening labor market outcomes and fear of jobs losses will increase
workers tendency to engage in stress coping mechanisms such as alcohol consumption.
My empirical results indicate that higher import exposure from China has a statistically
significant positive correlation with both prevalence of drinking and binge drinking. The
effect on men are more pronounced than that for women. In addition, binge drinking in
men has a larger effect than the prevalence of drinking. However, for women, prevalence
of drinking has a larger effect than binge drinking. This study complements the literature
that have found increasing workplace injuries, illness and higher mortality rates because of
increasing Chinese import exposure.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the overview of the rise of China
and the changes in imports for the US. Section 3 discusses the previous literature. Section
4 describes the identification strategy and Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 presents
the empirical results and Section 7 offers my conclusion.
2Please see Autor et al. (2013), Pierce and Schott (2016a) and Acemoglu et al. (2016) for the adjustment
costs from increasing Chinese import competition.
3Please see Sullivan and Von Wachter (2009), Cheng and Chan (2008), McKee-Ryan et al. (2005) for the
health effects of worsening labor market conditions.
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3.2 The Rise of China
Post World War II, China followed a centrally-planned system until the death of its
leader Mao Zedong in 1978. The next leader, Deng Xiaoping, initiated a series of reforms,
moving China towards a more market-based system. Many of these reforms set China on
the pace for faster growth. There are mainly two explanations for the economic growth of
China after the reforms. The first emphasizes the role of foreign investments in the Special
Economic Zones (SEZ) to spur growth. The other focuses on the internal reforms in rural
and interior regions of agricultural pricing system, land contracting and the entry of rural
businesses known an township and village enterprises. Huang (2012) argues that the internal
reform played a much larger role than the foreign investments in manufacturing. He finds
that even at its peak, foreign funded firms only employed 18 million people; in contrast,
even in its trough, the employment in township and village enterprises employed 28 million
people. The financial liberalization of these township and village enterprises brought more
than 154 million people out of poverty.4
Nonethess, these reforms increased the enterprises that were foreign-funded and un-
leashed the productivity that was latent during the Mao era. According to World Bank,
the share of inflows of foreign direct investment to China increased from an average of 0.7%
of GDP in the 1980’s to about 4.2% of its GDP in 2000’s. The Penn World Table ranked
China 126th out of 167 countries it monitors in terms of GDP per capita in 1991. By 2001
it had risen to 101st.5 One key feature of China’s economic turnaround is the growth in its
exports - especially manufacturing exports. China’s share of world manufacturing exports
increased from about 2.3% in 1991 to about 15% in 2007. China turned into a global manu-
facturing factory as its revealed comparative advantage (RCA) turned from a disadvantage
to advantage in 1992 (Autor et al., 2016b).6 One of the major reasons for its strength in
manufacturing is its abundant supply of labor relative to the rest of the world, which al-
lows it specialize in more labor-intensive industries. Thus, China has a positive net exports
4Please see Huang (2012) for a more detailed discussion on the relative influence of foreign funded firms
and township and village enterprises in the growth of Chinese economy.
5The data is based on constant 2005 dollars from Penn World Tables 8.0 database.
6Revealed comparative advantage is described as a country’s share of global exports in an industry divided
by its share of aggregate global exports.
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in manufacturing, and the growth in Chinese exports have been pervasive in all countries.
Husted and Nishioka (2013) use the Constant Market Share (CMS) analysis to show that
the growth in Chinese exports have not decreased the export shares of developing countries,
but have come at the expense of exporters based in developed countries such as Japan and
the US.
Figure 3.1 shows the US imports from China for the period 1991-2008. Imports from
China has increased from 26 billion in 1992 to over 350 billion in 2008, a growth of more
than 1200%. Chinese exports received a boost after it joined the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) in 2001. As shown in the figure, the growth of import from China increases
sharply after it joins the WTO. The road to WTO mattered for China because in moving
towards compliance with WTO provisions, it idled many state-owned manufacturing enter-
prises, which allowed capital and labor to reallocate from less productive, small state-owned
companies to privately owned manufacturing companies, raising productivity and output
(Hsieh and Song, 2015). However, it is important to note that the increase in imports
across industries is not uniform – some industries imports has increased substantially more
compared to other industries. Looking at the changes in import penetration of industries,
women footwear industries penetration has increased by almost a 100 percent from 1991 to
2007, while the import penetration of industries such as automotive and coated fabrics reveal
almost a zero penetration.7. Likewise, imports in the games, toys and dolls manufacturing
industry was $3.2 billion in 1991, which rose to $11.8 billion in 2000 and to $20.2 billion in
2007. This variation in import penetration of Chinese goods coupled with the variation in
industry specialization within different regions of the US gives us the opportunity to study
the effects of these trade shocks at a more local, regional level.
3.3 Literature Review
Recent literature has shown that the increasing import competition from China worsens
the labor market outcomes for a large number of workers. Pierce and Schott (2016a) look
7Import penetration at an industry level is defined as the change in imports of the industry from 1991
to 2007 divided by the 1991 total domestic supply. (Domestic supply equals total production plus imports
minus exports)
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at the elimination of potential tariff increases in 2000 after China joined the WTO at man-
ufacturing employment in the US and find a sharp drop in employment. At the plant level,
they respond to the import competition by switching to more less labor-intensive production
process, which contributes to the decline in employment. Likewise, Autor et al. (2013) show
that the increasing exposure from China also leads to fall in employment and reduction in
wages. In addition, the labor force participation also decreases.
The response of firms have many health consequences for the workers. Firms respond to
increasing import competition by cutting down their cost, including those related to worker
safety. This may increase work-related injuries and sickness. McManus and Schaur (2016)
show that worker injuries and illness increased in industries competing with Chinese imports
over the short and medium run, especially in smaller establishments. Their calculation
show that injury risk increases by 13%. Likewise, firms can also reduce costs by increasing
the workload of the workers who do not lose their job. A higher workload also has many
potential health effects on workers. Hummels et al. (2015) look at the effects of export
shocks for Danish firms. They find that exogenous demand shocks increases worker injures
and illness. Further, the increasing workload of workers lead them to take fewer sick-days,
but it also increased hospitalizations of workers due to heart attacks and strokes by 15%.
The increasing threat of job insecurity, lower labor force participation can result in a
higher mental and physical stress level due to additional financial pressures on workers. In
the meta-analytic study by McKee-Ryan et al. (2005), they show that unemployed people
had lower psychological and physical-well being than people who were employed. Likewise
Paul and Moser (2009) find that, on average, 34% of unemployed exhibited psychological
problems compared to only 16% of employed people. It is important to note that the health
effects are not only limited to job loss, but also job insecurity. Cheng and Chan (2008)
present findings that show employees with longer tenure had a negative effect on health
outcomes compared to shorter tenure workers. This finding was consistent across gender.
In addition, job insecurity of a worker may have spillover effects on their family members.
Wilson et al. (1993) demonstrate that a workers fear of losing their job also has an adverse
impact on the emotional and mental well-being of their spouses.
Sullivan and Von Wachter (2009) looked at the employment and earnings of Pennsyl-
Sandeep Sharma 66
vanian workers in the 1970s and 1980s and found that mortality rates in the year after
displacement are 50% - 100% higher for high-seniority male workers than would otherwise
have been expected. Interestingly, they find that although the mortality hazards decreases
over time, the annual death hazards is 10%-15% higher even after twenty years after displace-
ment. Recently, Pierce and Schott (2016b) look at the effect of increasing Chinese exposure
on mortality at the county level for the US. Using proprietary data that summarizes the
death certificates, they find that counties that were more exposed to Chinese competition
have higher rates of suicide, which are primarily concentrated among white males. However,
they do find that more exposed counties had lower rates of fatal heart attacks.
Literature analyzing the effect of job loss or job insecurity on alcohol consumption find
different results. For instance, Dee (2001) finds that overall drinking decreases during eco-
nomic downturns, and Ruhm and Black (2002) find that when state unemployment rates
increases, overall drinking decreases, largely among existing drinkers. On the other hand,
French and Davalos (2011) find that binge drinking and drunk-driving increases as unem-
ployment rate increases; Dooley and Prause (1998) find that job loss is positively related
with alcohol misuse.
My study aims to capture both health effects in a region due to higher displacement of
workers by import competition and the ancillary consequences of higher import exposure
in the affected regions. I hypothesize that worker respond to the worsening labor market
outcomes by resorting to consuming more alcohol to cope up with the higher stress.
3.4 Identification Strategy
3.4.1 Import Exposure Measure
I follow the measure developed by Autor et al. (2013) to look at import exposure from
China. To construct this measure, I first map the US imports from China at the HS6 product
level data with the SIC87 industries that manufactures each product.8 I then apportion each
of these industry’s imports to counties based on their share of national industry employment.
I weight this with the share of employment of the industry in a county with the total
8My crosswalk for the mapping comes from David Dorn’s website.
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employment of the county. This will measure the per-worker share of the change in import
exposure from China for each individual county. Mathematically, it can be expressed as:
∆Exposurect =
∑
j
Ljct
Lct
∗ ∆importsjt
Ljt
(3.1)
where
Ljct
Lct
is the share of county c workers employed in industry j in year t and
∆importsjt
Ljt
is
the change in imports from China per-worker employed in industry j. The variation in the
import exposure measure comes from the heteregenous specialization of industry in different
counties, and the differences in import growth from China at the industry level.
3.4.2 Instrumental Variable
One of the concerns in estimating the effect of increasing import competition from China
in the US local labor market is that there maybe a reverse causality problem. That is,
import competition in a county may increase in those counties that have deterioated labor
market conditions. Hence, it is important to establish that the increasing import competition
from China is “supply-side” driven. Therefore, to isolate this effect, I look at Chinese
imports in eight other high income countries. These are are Australia, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland. Chinese imports to these countries
is uncorrelated with the demand shocks at the county level in the US. I then construct the
instrumental variable as follows:
∆IVct =
∑
j
Ljct−5
Lct−5
∗ ∆imports
others
jt
Ljt−5
(3.2)
where
Ljct−5
Lct−5
is the share of county c workers employed in the industry j at time t − 5,
and
∆importsothersjt
Ljt−5
is the Chinese import change in the eight other high income countries
as a share of total industry j employed at time t − 5. The employment level is five-year
lagged as this would mitigate the concern of employments changing in anticipation of future
increase in imports from China. This reduces the simultaneity bias. However, one concern
about the instrument is that the imports from China for these eight other high income
countries are driven by the same demand shocks that increases the Chinese imports to the
US. Nonetheless, the instrument is widely used in the literature that studies the effect of
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Chinese import exposure to the US.
3.4.3 Empirical Specification
The estimation model for my analysis follows the first difference equation. The benefit
of employing the first difference equation is that it will difference out any time invariant
county-level characteristics related to the health outcomes. The reduced form model for the
change in alcohol consumption is given by the following equation:
∆ACct = β0 + β1∆Exposurect + β2Mct + β3Xct + δreg + ct (3.3)
where ∆ACct is the difference of alcohol consumption for county c between the beginning of
period and the end of period. ∆Exposurect is the key explanatory variable of interest and
represents the change in exposure per-worker of county c to import competition, Mct is the
start of the period county employment that was accounted for by manufacturing, and δreg
controls for census region fixed effects. The vector Xct controls for the c-zone’s start of the
period demographic variables. These include the percentage of population that is college
educated, the share of population between 18-25 years, and the share of population that is
black.
The health effect associated with the rise in Chinese import exposure may suffer from the
reverse causality problem; if the growth in import exposure from China is correlated with
the demand shocks, the OLS estimation from my specification will be biased. Therefore, I
instrument the exposure from China with the instrumental variable as described in equation
3.2. I will estimate the effect using the two-stage least squares method, where the first stage
will regress the endogenous chinese exposure to my instrument including my controls for the
second stage regression. The additional assumption that the error term is not related with
my instrument will result in a consistent estimation.9
9To further check the validity of the instrument, Autor et al. (2013) employ gravity identification strategy
to exogenously capture the supply-side effect and find that the increase in Chinese import exposure is not
driven by the same demand shocks in the US and the other eight high income countries.
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3.5 Data
In order to create my variable of interest, ∆Exposurect, I need data on the Chinese
imports to the US at industry level and the specialization of industry at the county level.
The data for Chinese imports comes from the United Nation’s Commodity Trade Statistics
Database (UN Comtrade). The data is provided at the six digit Harmonized System (HS)
product level. I match the product level data with the industries that produce these products
at the SIC87 classification using the crosswalk provided by Autor et al. (2013). The industry
specialization at the county level is based on the employment of each industry in the county.
If a county has a higher share of its employment in industry j, the county is more specialized
in industry j. I get the data on the number of employees by industry-county from the Census
County Business Pattern (CBP) database. Since the employment data is provided only in
brackets, a fixed point algorithm is used to estimate the employment numbers within the
bracket.10
CBP provides the information for each year starting from 1986. However, for the years
in my sample, they define industries at the North American Industry Classification Sys-
tem(NAICS) of 1992 for the year 2002, and the NAICS2002 code for the year 2006. There-
fore, I use the concordance table provided by the Census to convert these industries into the
SIC87 classification to match with my trade data.11
The data for alcohol consumption comes from the Institute for Health Metrics and Eval-
uation (IHME) at the University of Washington which provides “rigorous and comparable
measurement of the world’s most important health problems”. The data provides the age
standardized prevalence of drinking at the county level. The county level data is estimated
using the small area models to the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS)
data taking into account any of methodical changes to the BRFSS during the sample period.
For my sample period, I can get the prevalence data for “any” and “binge” drinking. “Any”
10David Dorn provides the code to estimate the employment in his website. It is available at
http://www.ddorn.net/data.htm.
11Many industries that were classified in the SIC87 classification were consolidated into a single industry
in the NAICS02 and NAICS06 classification. Therefore, I use the crosswalk provided by David Dorn to split
these industries into the two or more industries at the SIC87 groups. I use the weights provided for each
split, to calculate the employment at the SIC87 industry level. This will ensure that all my data will be
consistent at the SIC87 industry classification for the different years.
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drinking is defined as having at least one drink of any alcoholic beverage in the past thirty
days. “Binge” drinking is defined as the consumption of more than four drinks for women
or five drinks for men on a single occasion at least once in the past thirty days.
Table 3.1 provides the summary statistics of my variables. The average increase in Chi-
nese import exposure across counties was $1344 per worker, with the maximum exposure of
$36, 358 per worker. Given the standard deviation of $2043 per worker, there is considerable
variation in import exposure across counties because of the variation in imports from China
and the variation in county industry specialization. Binge drinking has been declining by
0.5 percentage point, with the decline for men being five times more than that for women.
However, the prevalence of drinking has been increasing by 0.7 percentage point, with the
average increase in female drinking by 1.5 percentage points. The prevalence of drinking for
men has been declining. There is also a large variation in the prevalence of drinking and
binge drinking between counties. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the distribution of percentage
point change in “any” drinking and binge drinking of counties.
3.6 Results
I first estimate equation 3.3 to study the effect of increasing import exposure on alcohol
consumption. In discussing the magnitude of the findings, the estimates are in per $1000
change in import exposure at the county level. All changes in alcohol consumption are in
percentage points. I first present the OLS results, and then look at the IV specification.
3.6.1 OLS Result
The OLS findings are reported in Table 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.2
presents the results for “any” drinking, and columns 3 and 4 provides the results for binge
drinking. The baseline controls are the share of manufacturing employment and region
fixed effect. In columns 3 and 4, I add additional demographic controls. Column 1 shows
that a $1000 increase in Chinese exposure increases the prevalence of any drinking by 0.03
percentage points. The magnitude increases slightly when I add demographic controls to
the specification, but are significant at 5 percent. In terms of binge drinking, the import
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exposure seems to have a larger effect than “any” drinking. The estimates with baseline
and demographic controls show that a thousand dollar increase in exposure, increases binge
drinking by a little over 0.04 percentage point. This shows that financial stress and the fear
of job loss because of increasing import competition increases the binge drinking tendency
in workers.
However, it may be that males and females take to drinking differently to cope with
the stress. Therefore in Table 3.3, I look at this effect on subsamples of male and female
population. In terms of “any” drinking, the magnitude of my estimates are similar between
males and females. The estimates show that increasing import competition increases the
prevalence of drinking in both males and females by over 0.03 percentage point. The point
estimates are statistically significant at 5 percent. Next, I estimate the effect on binge
drinking. Based on my hypothesis, the fear of job loss and lower cumulative earnings must
increase the binge drinking tendency of the workers under the assumption that alcohol serves
as a coping mechanism. I present the result in Table 3.4. Unlike the prevalence of drinking,
I find that binge drinking tendency is different for men and women. My estimates show that
the binge drinking in men increases by 0.05 percentage point, whereas it only increases by
0.02 percentage in women. The higher effect in men are more in line with the results of
Pierce and Schott (2016a) who show a higher mortality rates for men than women because
of increasing import competition from China.
3.6.2 Instrumental Variable and 2SLS Results
If Chinese exposure are correlated with the demand shocks, my OLS estimates will have
a downward bias. To mitigate this effect and to tease out the “supply-side” effect, I make use
of the instrumental variable approach to look at the effect of an exogenous rise in Chinese
exposure at the county level. I use the instrument measured as described in equation 3.2 to
get a more consistent estimate on alcohol consumption. The results are presented in Tables
3.5, 3.6 and 3.7.
The first two columns of Table 3.5 presents the estimates for drinking prevalence and
columns 3 and 4 shows the results for binge drinking. I also show the first stage F-stat and
r-square for my first stage regression. Compared to the OLS regression, my point estimates
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are significantly larger for both drinking prevalence and binge drinking. I find that a $1000
increase in Chinese import exposure increases the prevalence of drinking by 0.16 percentage
points, whereas binge drinking increases by 0.14 percentage points. These estimates are
statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Next, I look at the effect for the prevalence of drinking on my subsamples by sex. I
find that the drinking prevalence for men are higher than that for women. For men, I find
that Chinese exposure increases drinking by 0.18 percentage points, whereas for women it
increases by 0.13 percentage points. Likewise, Table 3.7 shows the effect for binge drinking
for men and women. The magnitude of my estimates are larger than my OLS estimates.
However, just as in the OLS case, I do find that binge drinking increases in men compared
to women. For men, when I include both baseline and demographic controls, I find that
binge drinking increases by 0.17 percentage points. However, for women, it increases by 0.11
percentage points. It is also interesting to note that the binge drinking in men increases by
more than prevalence of drinking for men. For women, increasing Chinese exposure has a
larger effect on prevalence of drinking than binge drinking.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper studies the effect of increasing Chinese import exposure on alcohol consump-
tion measured by prevalence of drinking and binge drinking. I find empirical evidence that
Chinese import exposure increases both the prevalence of drinking and binge drinking. Fur-
thermore, I find that these effects are different for men and women. Men have a higher
percentage point change in drinking prevalence and binge drinking as compared to women.
In addition, the effect on binge drinking is larger than the prevalence of drinking for men,
whereas the prevalence of drinking is affected more for women than their binge drinking.
My results shed more light on the recent adjustment costs of trade shocks from China.
Further, they do support a wave of recent literature that find that increasing Chinese expo-
sure increases the illness, work place injury and mortality rates among workers. Thus, it is
important to mitigate these problems with relevant policy measure. Further research on the
other health effects of Chinese trade shock will give us a better insight into the health costs
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of the trade shock.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
China Imp. Exp. 3052 1.344 2.043 -1.659 36.358
BingeDrinkingChangeBoth 3052 -.554 1.252 -8.9 9.5
BingeDrinkingChangeFemale 3052 -.024 1.122 -6.5 10.5
BingeDrinkingChangeMale 3052 -1.106 1.727 -12.4 8.6
AnyDrinkingChangeBoth 3052 .722 2.002 -10.8 9.8
AnyDrinkingChangeFemale 3052 1.526 2.18 -10.6 11.9
AnyDrinkingChangeMale 3052 -.111 2.173 -11.1 12.3
Note: All import exposure are in $ 1000 per worker in the county as defined
in equation 3.1. All changes in alcohol consumption are in percentage terms.
Table 3.2: OLS Estimates of Import Exposure on Drinking
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES AnyDrink AnyDrink BingeDrink BingeDrink
China Imp. Exp. 0.0373** 0.0387** 0.0437*** 0.0403***
(0.0159) (0.0154) (0.0109) (0.0107)
Observations 3,052 3,052 3,052 3,052
R-squared 0.156 0.183 0.158 0.167
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes
Notes: ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respec-
tively. Constants are included in the model but are not reported. Baseline
controls include region fixed effects and start of period manufacturing share.
Demographic controls include share of population under 25, share of popu-
lation that is black, and share of population that has a college degree and
unemployment rate, all at the beginning of period level. Robust standard
errors.
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Table 3.3: OLS Estimates of Import Exposure on “Any” Drinking by sex
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES AnyDrink Male AnyDrink Male AnyDrink Fem AnyDrink Fem
China Imp. Exp. 0.0365** 0.0395** 0.0380** 0.0378**
(0.0186) (0.0175) (0.0163) (0.0163)
Observations 3,052 3,052 3,052 3,052
R-squared 0.145 0.179 0.122 0.153
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes
Notes: ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. Constants
are included in the model but are not reported. Baseline controls include region fixed effects and
start of period manufacturing share. Demographic controls include share of population under
25, share of population that is black, and share of population that has a college degree and
unemployment rate, all at the beginning of period level. Robust standard errors.
Table 3.4: OLS Estimates of Import Exposure on “Binge” Drinking by sex
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES BingeDrink Male BingeDrink Male BingeDrink Fem BingeDrink Fem
China Imp. Exp. 0.0602*** 0.0550*** 0.0280*** 0.0263***
(0.0153) (0.0149) (0.00858) (0.00857)
Observations 3,052 3,052 3,052 3,052
R-squared 0.134 0.147 0.190 0.196
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes
Notes: ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. Constants are
included in the model but are not reported. Baseline controls include region fixed effects and start
of period manufacturing share. Demographic controls include share of population under 25, share of
population that is black, and share of population that has a college degree and unemployment rate,
all at the beginning of period level. Robust standard errors.
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Table 3.5: 2SLS Estimates of Import Exposure on Drinking
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES AnyDrink AnyDrink BingeDrink BingeDrink
China Imp. Exp. 0.172*** 0.163*** 0.160*** 0.147***
(0.0525) (0.0496) (0.0357) (0.0349)
Observations 3,052 3,052 3,052 3,052
R-squared 0.141 0.170 0.130 0.143
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes
Partial R-square 0.306 0.307 0.306 0.307
F-stat 135.4 95.94 135.4 95.94
Notes: ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respec-
tively. Constants are included in the model but are not reported. Baseline
controls include region fixed effects and start of period manufacturing share.
Demographic controls include share of population under 25, share of popu-
lation that is black, and share of population that has a college degree and
unemployment rate, all at the beginning of period level. Robust standard
errors.
Table 3.6: 2SLS Estimates of Import Exposure on “Any” Drinking by Sex
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES AnyDrink Male AnyDrink Male AnyDrink Fem AnyDrink Fem
China Imp. Exp. 0.183*** 0.195*** 0.165*** 0.136***
(0.0564) (0.0551) (0.0571) (0.0524)
Observations 3,052 3,052 3,052 3,052
R-squared 0.130 0.163 0.111 0.146
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes
Partial R-square 0.306 0.307 0.306 0.307
F-stat 135.4 95.94 135.4 95.94
Notes: ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. Constants
are included in the model but are not reported. Baseline controls include region fixed effects and
start of period manufacturing share. Demographic controls include share of population under
25, share of population that is black, and share of population that has a college degree and
unemployment rate, all at the beginning of period level. Robust standard errors.
Sandeep Sharma 77
Table 3.7: 2SLS Estimates of Import Exposure on “Binge” Drinking by Sex
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES BingeDrink Male BingeDrink Male BingeDrink Fem BingeDrink Fem
China Imp. Exp. 0.202*** 0.176*** 0.119*** 0.119***
(0.0526) (0.0497) (0.0321) (0.0322)
Observations 3,052 3,052 3,052 3,052
R-squared 0.112 0.131 0.168 0.174
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes
Partial R-square 0.306 0.307 0.306 0.307
F-stat 135.4 95.94 135.4 95.94
Notes: ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. Constants are
included in the model but are not reported. Baseline controls include region fixed effects and start
of period manufacturing share. Demographic controls include share of population under 25, share of
population that is black, and share of population that has a college degree and unemployment rate,
all at the beginning of period level. Robust standard errors.
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Figure 3.1: US Import from China
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Figure 3.2: Percentage Point Change for “Any” Drinking
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Figure 3.3: Percentage Point Change for Binge Drinking
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